American University Law Review
Volume 57 | Issue 5

Article 2

2008

Transcript: Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of
Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11
America
American University Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
American University Law Review.et al. "Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11
America." American University Law Review 57, no.5 ( June 2008): 1203-1271.

This Conference & Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Transcript: Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and
the Press in Post-9/11 America
Keywords

Constitution, Free Speech, First Amendment Rights, human rights, 9.11, terrorism

This conference & symposia is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol57/
iss5/2

SYMPOSIUM TRANSCRIPTS
LEFT OUT IN THE COLD? THE CHILLING
OF SPEECH, ASSOCIATION, AND THE
PRESS IN POST-9/11 AMERICA
SEPTEMBER 20–21, 2007
I. Panel: Constitutional Overview of Post-9/11 Barriers to
Free Speech and a Free Press
A. Nadine Strossen................................................................1204
II. Panel: Restrictions on Freedom of Association Through
Material Support Prohibitions and Visa Denials
A. David Cole.........................................................................1212
III. Panel: Censoring and Prosecuting the Press—An
Assessment of Reporter’s Shield Legislation
A. Steven D. Clymer ..............................................................1218
IV. Panel: Surveillance and its Impact on First Amendment
Rights
A. Jameel Jaffer......................................................................1224
V. Panel: Secrecy and Barriers to Open Government
A. Glenn M. Sulmasy.............................................................1229
B. Erwin Chemerinsky ..........................................................1234
C. David M. Hardy.................................................................1239
VI. Panel: The Role of Whistleblowers to Facilitate
Government Accountability
A. Valerie Caproni ................................................................1243
VII. Congressional Panel: Setting a Positive Legislative Agenda
for the First Amendment
A. Congressman Robert C. “Bobby” Scott ...........................1248
B. Congressman Mike Pence ................................................1262

1203

1204
I.

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1203

PANEL: CONSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW OF POST-9/11 BARRIERS TO
FREE SPEECH AND A FREE PRESS
A. Nadine Strossen∗

I am delighted to chime in on this fascinating conversation about
overview principles, and I would like to start by responding to a
couple of the ideas that have been presented. First, with respect to
the constitutional text, I take a somewhat different approach from
the fascinating one that Dean Rodney Smolla set out. I think there is
great significance to what the Constitution does say and what it does
not say about special emergency powers, war powers, and so forth.
Our Constitution’s Framers did not include a general emergency
provision of the sort that Dean Claudio Grossman talked about,
which is characteristic of not only international and regional human
rights treaties, but also the constitutions of other modern
democracies. Those treaties and constitutions provide very stringent
preconditions and strict judicial review for the exercise of emergency
power.
In contrast, I think it is striking that our Framers made an
apparently deliberate decision to include no general emergency
exception whatsoever to the usual constitutional framework for
limiting government powers and securing individual rights. I think it
is apparent that this was an intentional decision because the Framers
did include one very specific emergency exception. That one
exception allows Congress, under very narrow circumstances, limited
to “Cases of Rebellion or Invasion,” to suspend the writ of habeas
1
corpus “when . . . the public Safety may require it.” The fact that this
“Suspension Clause” imposes such strict constraints upon the specific
emergency exception that it authorizes bolsters the inference that
there is no textual justification for a general emergency exception.
It is not so interesting that I, the ACLU President, reached that
conclusion; that should not be surprising. I think it is far more
interesting and surprising that the Supreme Court stressed that
2
conclusion in its first post-9/11 decision, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. I had
been very nervous about what this Supreme Court was going to do
post-9/11. In the Vietnam era, the Supreme Court did not decide
these kinds of cases. The most recent litigated situation was from
∗ President, American Civil Liberties Union; Professor of Law, New York Law
School; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1975; A.B., Harvard College, 1972.
1. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2.
2. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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World War II, where the Court pays lip service to applying strict
scrutiny, and yet at the same time allows blatant racial discrimination
and incarceration without demanding any evidence from the
3
government. This shows that regardless of how strictly the tests are
formulated, they can always be manipulated or paid lip service.
Moreover, the Bush Administration argued that there should be no
judicial review at all of its assertions of seemingly boundless executive
power in the name of the “War on Terror.” The Administration
maintained that the Court should not hear any of these cases, and its
fallback position was that if the Court did hear the cases, it should
apply the rubber-stamping-type deference of the sort that we had
seen in the past. So, although Hamdi was hardly a perfect decision
from a civil libertarian’s perspective, it was such an enormous relief
given the historical background. I could not agree more with both of
my co-panelists that over time there has been an evolution of more
judicial protection, for more individual rights, in more
circumstances, including emergency circumstances.
What I thought was particularly striking was that, of all the different
opinions in the Hamdi case, the one that most strongly stood up for
individual rights protected by courts, even in times of emergency, was
the dissent authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, with the strange
4
bedfellow of Justice John Paul Stevens joining the opinion. This is
also very encouraging. That the Court’s most outspoken conservative
joined the Court’s most outspoken liberal shows that these issues of
individual liberty and checks against government abuses of power do
not fall along the usual ideological or partisan political divides. One
of the points that the Scalia-Stevens opinion heavily stressed was the
point that I noted earlier, that the Constitution itself provides only
one exception for only one right in times of war: Congress’s power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
Dean Rodney Smolla stopped talking about precedents somewhere
around the late-1960s, or perhaps at the beginning of the 1970s, so
he did not talk about what I think is the most important precedent
5
for free speech protection in times of war, the Pentagon Papers case.
That case took place in 1971, while the United States was still
engaged in the Vietnam War. The Nixon Administration made very
serious claims about how publishing the Pentagon Papers would
undermine the war effort and national security. Notably, these claims
were accepted by not only the dissenting Justices, but also two Justices
3. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
4. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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in the majority.
All five of these Justices accepted the
Administration’s claims that there would be a series of specific harms
that would occur through the publication of the Pentagon Papers,
including killing of American soldiers overseas and interference with
diplomatic efforts to end the war. There is a very short so-called “per
curiam opinion” for the Court as a whole, followed by nine separate
opinions. Although a majority of five Justices actually agreed with the
government’s assertion that the publication of these papers would
lead to enormous harms, including undermining national security,
six Justices still voted against restricting freedom of speech in that
case.
As other commentators, including Dean Rodney Smolla and
Professor Thomas Healy, have suggested, even though the tests for
various kinds of free speech restrictions are formulated somewhat
differently, they essentially are all variations on the theme of strict
scrutiny. Therefore, while the Pentagon Papers case specifically
6
addresses prior restraints, and while Brandenburg v. Ohio specifically
addresses incitement, they both use versions of strict judicial scrutiny.
The details of the Court’s analytical framework in each of these
particular factual contexts may be different, but the overall concept is
the same. Any restriction on freedom of speech is presumptively
unconstitutional, and the government must bear a very heavy burden
of proof, an appropriately heavy burden of proof, to overcome that
presumption of unconstitutionality.
Strict scrutiny is, of course, a two-part test. First, the government
must show that there is an interest of compelling importance.
Second, the government must show that the restriction is narrowly
tailored, indeed necessary, in order to protect or promote that
compelling interest, which in the post-9/11 situation is national
security. The courts often say that the government has to use the
least restrictive alternative. If it could promote national security
without such a heavy invasion into First Amendment freedoms, then
the government has to use that less restrictive alternative.
One thing that I like about this strict scrutiny test is that it reflects
just plain common sense. After all, why should the government get
the power to restrict our freedom if it is not necessary, if the
government could effectively promote our national security with less
of an invasion on our freedom? Why should we sacrifice freedom
when that sacrifice is not necessary to promote national security?
That would not be a logical tradeoff. Therefore, I especially
6. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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appreciate one of the recommendations from the unanimous report
of the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States, commonly known as the Citizens’ Commission on
9/11, which essentially said that this form of strict judicial scrutiny
should be used as a matter of good common sense, good policy, and
7
good governance.
The first prong of that test is very easy to satisfy. It was easy to
satisfy in the Pentagon Papers case, and it is easy to satisfy post-9/11:
protecting national security is a compelling interest. Where the
rubber hits the road, and where the debate occurs, regards that
second prong: is this measure actually necessary? In addressing the
second prong, we should consider that many of the measures that are
touted as advancing national security have been criticized, including
by national security experts, as not even being effective, let alone
necessary. Worse yet, too many such measures are even
counterproductive to national security,
according to national
security experts. These concerns specifically apply to many of the
post-911 First Amendment restrictions.
These kinds of considerations were cited in a number of the
separate opinions in the Pentagon Papers case. As several Justices
observed in that case, national security and freedom of speech go
hand in hand. When the government denies the public access to
information, which is the common theme of so many of the First
Amendment violations we are fighting now, it actually undermines
national security. Let us consider a few of the statements that the
Supreme Court issued in this vein in the Pentagon Papers case,
because it is the leading precedent. These statements are completely
applicable to the current situation. I hope that when these issues get
to the Supreme Court, the Court will be guided by these kinds of
statements. Justice Hugo Black wrote: “The guarding of military and
diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative
8
As
government provides no real security for our Republic.”
Congressman Scott noted earlier, even Congress cannot get basic
information from the current Administration, and our elected
representatives cannot make rational and informed decisions about
national security if they do not get this basic information.
Justice William O. Douglas expanded on this core insight by noting
that our elected representatives cannot and will not correct their
mistakes so long as the mistakes remain hidden under a veil of
7. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
REPORT 394–95 (2004).
8. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 719.

UPON THE

U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION

1208

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1203

secrecy imposed for the asserted purpose of promoting national
9
security, but that really had a completely different purpose.
Government officials are perennially tempted to use government
secrecy to cover-up embarrassing information, which we saw when
one of my heroes, Coleen Rowley, blew the whistle on cover-ups of
mistakes and misconduct in the FBI. Cautioning against such abuse
in his opinion in the Pentagon Papers case, Justice Douglas wrote,
“Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic,
10
perpetuating bureaucratic errors.”
He goes on to say, “The
dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the
widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing
11
information.” In light of history, we have to be alert to the pattern
of how and why the government actually uses its powers to impose
secrecy. Is the power used to protect “We the People,” or is it really a
cover-up for mistakes or misconduct by government officials?
Justice Potter Stewart’s opinion in the Pentagon Papers case
contained the most subtle, and I think the most intriguing, argument
about the negative interrelationship between government secrecy and
national security. He explained that a system of excessive secrecy
quickly deteriorates into one, seemingly paradoxically, of inadequate
secrecy. As he stated:
When everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the
system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical . . . and to be
manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion. .
. . [T]he hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would
be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can
12
best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.

These general insights about the positive impact that reducing
secrecy has on national security were specifically endorsed by the
bipartisan Citizens’ Commission on 9/11.
The Commission
determined that unjustified government secrecy, including overclassification, had undermined national security pre-9/11.
It
suggested that if more information had been more widely shared, not
only among government agencies, but also with the public, the press,
and Congress, then there would have been a greater chance of
connecting the dots, potentially even averting the terrible tragedy on
9/11. Therefore, moving forward, in the interest of preventing
another such catastrophe, the 9/11 Commission expressly
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 720–24 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 724.
Id. at 723–24.
Id. at 729 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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recommended more government openness. It said, “Secrecy stifles
oversight, accountability, and information sharing. Unfortunately, all
the current organizational incentives encourage over-classification.
13
This balance should change . . . .” I have to underscore that this
recommendation was made not in the spirit of promoting civil
liberties, which is the ACLU’s mandate, but rather in the spirit of
promoting national security. In short, this is a vivid example of the
mutually reinforcing relationship between First Amendment
freedoms and national security.
Some of the Justices’ individual opinions in the Pentagon Papers
case recognize another fundamental constitutional principle at stake.
Protecting the free flow of information and countering undue
government secrecy are essential underpinnings, not only of
individual freedom, but also of our whole government system of
checks and balances. A free press that has access to, and the right to
publish information about Executive Branch policies, is a critical
pillar of both congressional oversight and judicial review. Conversely,
when the Executive Branch stifles or withholds information from the
other branches of government, as well as from the public, that
corrodes our fundamental political system, as well as individual
freedom. Unfortunately, this is exactly what the Executive Branch
has been doing since 9/11, as Congressman Scott lamented. In fact,
this Administration has been so stubborn in refusing to provide basic
information to Congress, and so disdainful of Congress’s requests for
information, that it has earned the criticism of even conservative
Republicans, who substantively support the Administration’s policies.
As they complain, the Administration’s withholding of information
undermines their ability to perform their essential functions as our
elected representatives, including their responsibilities to maintain
oversight of the Executive Branch.
In my limited time, I would like to mention two illustrations of this
vital interrelationship between the First Amendment freedoms and
our government system of checks and balances. I am going to focus
on the courts because under the structure of the Constitution, the
courts are designed to serve as the ultimate safety net, especially at
times of crisis when the branches of government that are politically
accountable tend to be timorous and to act based on expediency
rather than principle.

13. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report
_Exec.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).
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As I previously mentioned, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many
federal judges fortunately have ruled in favor of the ACLU’s cases
that challenge abuses of government power and defend individual
liberty, including freedom of speech. The first illustration is one very
important victory that we won exactly two weeks ago today, when a
federal judge struck down a provision of the Patriot Act under both
14
the First Amendment and a separation of powers principle,
specifically the judicial review powers introduced by Marbury v.
15
16
In Doe v. Gonzales, Judge Victor Marrero of the U.S
Madison.
District Court for the Southern District of New York quoted from
Marbury v. Madison repeatedly in his opinion invalidating the section
of the Patriot Act that authorizes secret surveillance under National
Security Letters or “NSL’s.” This provision imposed gag orders on all
Internet Service Providers, librarians and others who receive NSL’s
seeking information about their patrons’ communications. Judge
Marrero struck down this provision specifically because of its tight
constraints on judicial review. He stressed the vital interrelationship
between the judicial review power and the First Amendment
freedoms that the NSL provision violated.
For example, Judge
Marrero wrote:
The Constitution was designed so that the dangers of any given
moment would never suffice as justification for discarding
fundamental individual liberties or circumscribing the judiciary’s
unique role under our governmental system in protecting those
liberties and upholding the rule of law. It is the judiciary’s
independent function to uphold the Constitution even if to do so
may mean curtailing Congress’s efforts to confer greater freedom
on the executive to investigate national security threats.17

In short, through the power of judicial review, Judge Marrero was
able to enforce both First Amendment rights and the judicial review
power itself, reinforcing the positive interrelationship between them.
As a second illustration of the relationship between the First
Amendment and judicial review, let me give you an example of the
dark side, the glass half-empty perspective. It shows how the judicial
review power can be thwarted through undue Executive Branch
secrecy, thus undermining both checks and balances and First
Amendment freedoms. I am specifically referring to how judicial
review power has been completely frustrated to an alarming extent by
14. Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
15. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
16. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
17. Id. at 414–15.
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the government’s abuse of, and many courts’ acceptance of, the “state
secrets privilege.” As a result, the Executive Branch has effectively
been immunized from any judicial review of even the most egregious
violations of constitutional rights, including First Amendment
freedoms. Such abuses are analyzed in the powerful new report put
together by James Tucker and his ACLU colleagues, which refers to
18
such acts as “governing in the shadows.” While this topic is not as
well known as it should be, Louis Fisher has written a book on this
19
subject, In the Name of National Security, which I recommend to you.
In its origin, the state secrets privilege was designed to protect
particular pieces of evidence that were shown to be dangerous to
national security if they came to light. That narrow application has
been completely expanded, distorted, and exaggerated, so the
privilege is now being used systematically to completely dismiss cases
before the introduction of any evidence, even cases claiming
enormous abuses of the most fundamental human rights, including
rendition to countries that we know engage in torture.
This has become such a serious problem that, after considerable
deliberation and risk analysis, the ACLU decided to ask the United
States Supreme Court to review this issue in two cases, one of which
20
directly involved the First Amendment. The ACLU reached this
decision because we believe that the overblown use of the state
secrets privilege is such a serious threat to all freedoms, including
First Amendment rights. Further, we believe that there is a likelihood
that the Supreme Court, being part of an independent branch of
government with an investment in defending checks and balances,
will re-examine and cut back on the abuse of this privilege to
undermine both individual rights and the judicial review power to
enforce individual rights. Let me read just the closing lines in one of
the ACLU’s briefs seeking Supreme Court review of this issue, to give
you a flavor of what is at stake. Under cover of the government’s
distorted, exaggerated view of the state secrets privilege, our brief
writes,
. . . [T]he government may engage in torture, declare it a state
secret, and by virtue of that designation avoid any judicial
18. JAMES THOMAS TUCKER & SOPHIE ALCORN, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
RECLAIMING OUR RIGHTS: DECLARATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES
2 (2007), http://www.aclu.org/symposium/reclaiming_our_rights.pdf.
19. LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006).
20. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 373
(2007); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F.Supp.2d 65 (D.D.C.), aff’d 161 Fed.
App’x. 6 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 46 U.S. 1031 (2005).
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accountability for conduct that even the government purports to
condemn as unlawful under all circumstances. Under a system
predicated on respect for the rule of law, the government has no
privilege to violate our most fundamental legal norms, and it
should not be able to do so with impunity based on a state secrets
privilege that was developed to achieve very different ends.21

In conclusion, I would like to return to the Pentagon Papers case,
the leading case on press freedom, the First Amendment, and
national security. I would like to quote the federal trial judge who
issued the first opinion in the case, Judge Murray Gurfein of the U.S.
22
District Court for the Southern District of New York. I think it is
very notable that he was a former prosecutor who had a significant
background in military intelligence. It is especially noteworthy that,
with that background, Judge Gurfein strongly rejected the
government’s claims that First Amendment principles should yield to
national security concerns, rejecting the notion that these are
antithetical concepts. As he declared:
The security of the Nation is not at the ramparts alone. Security
also lies in the value of our free institutions. A cantankerous press,
an obstinate press, an ubiquitous press must be suffered by those in
authority in order to preserve the even greater values of freedom of
expression and the right of the people to know. . . . Yet in the last
analysis it is not merely the opinion of the editorial writer or of the
columnist which is protected by the First Amendment. It is the free
flow of information so that the public will be informed about the
23
Government and its actions.

II. PANEL: RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION THROUGH
MATERIAL SUPPORT PROHIBITIONS AND VISA DENIALS
A. David Cole∗
I am delighted to be here at the Washington College of Law, one of
the nation’s leaders in fighting for human rights and educating on
the subject of human rights. I am also honored to be on a panel with
representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union and PEN
American Center. One of my first cases as a young lawyer at the
Center for Constitutional Rights was working with PEN American
21. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, El-Masri, 128 S. Ct. 373 (No. 06-1613).
22. United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.) rev’d en banc per
curiam, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev’d, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
23. Id. at 331.
∗ Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., Yale Law School, 1984;
B.A., Yale University, 1980.
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Center and the ACLU in defending Margaret Randall. Margaret was
an American-born poet who obtained Mexican citizenship in the
1960s and lived abroad for a long time. She wrote many books very
critical of the United States and when she decided she wanted to
come back, the United States government initiated deportation
24
proceedings against her for her political views. She was accused of
having advocated world communism in her poetry and her journals.
This was not 1954, but 1984. But her case was a holdover from the
guilt by association days of the McCarthy era.
In the 1950s, we were afraid of Communism. We were afraid, in
particular, of the Soviet Union, the world’s second greatest
superpower, which was armed with masses of nuclear warheads aimed
at all our largest cities. As a result, we fought the Cold War, engaged
in espionage, proxy wars, and an arms race. We also took aggressive
preventive measures at home. The principal preventive measure of
that period was guilt by association. We made it a crime to be a
member of the Communist Party, and we created a whole
administrative scheme to implement and enforce this notion of guilt
by association.
There were a handful of criminal prosecutions of some leaders of
the Communist Party, and they had a substantial chilling effect. Yet
more effective than the criminal prosecutions were the administrative
mechanisms created to make sure that this theory was infused deeply
throughout society. President Truman issued an Executive Order
that required loyalty inquiry boards to investigate the political
ideologies, affiliations, and magazine subscription practices of
25
virtually all federal employees. Many private businesses that worked
with the federal government also had to undertake these loyalty
inquisitions. The House on Un-American Activities Committee
(“HUAC”) held congressional hearings, and encouraged the
development of a partnership between public and private entities in
the name of political repression. The HUAC would “out” people as
communists and then private industry, notably Hollywood, would
blacklist those individuals from getting any jobs. In the end, millions
of Americans were affected. It is now well accepted that guilt by
association was a gross overreaction adopted in the name of
prevention.
Today, the threat is terrorism, not communism. And as a doctrinal
matter at least, guilt by association is barred by the First and Fifth
24. Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
25. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947).

1214

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1203

Amendments. But we nonetheless see a remarkably similar reaction
in place. Instead of targeting association expressly, the government
targets “material support” for terrorist organizations. But the
essential features of this prohibition are the same. The government
employs an extremely broad criminal substantive standard—material
support—which encompasses any activity in association with a group
classified as a terrorist organization. Giving the organization money
is the most obvious example of material support, but even the
volunteering of one’s time also constitutes material support.
26
We not only have a broad criminal statute, but we also have
administrative and public-private partnership schemes for
implementing this prohibition. The Secretary of State, through an
administrative process, designates foreign terrorist organizations, and
the Secretary of the Treasury, through another administrative
process, identifies another list of proscribed terrorist groups, which
now includes over 1,000 names. The Treasury Department also
facilitates public-private partnerships by setting forth “voluntary
guidelines” that charities, foundations, and businesses are
27
encouraged to employ when they are doing their business.
Attorney General John Ashcroft called this the “paradigm of
28
prevention.” He argued that when you are facing terrorists who are
willing to commit suicide to inflict mass casualties on civilians, it is
not enough to bring them to justice after the fact; we have to prevent
the next terrorist attack from occurring. Of course, we all want to
prevent the next terrorist attack from occurring; no one wants to see
another 9/11. But the measures that the Administration has taken in
29
furtherance of this preventive paradigm are quite extreme. They
include preventive detention. And in my view, the material support
statute is a form of preventive detention.
The material support statutes hold people responsible, not for
what they have done in the past—the material support itself may be
negligible and there need be no showing that it has actually
furthered any kind of terrorist activity— but rather out of the fear
that they or those they support might do something bad in the

26. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2004).
27. Anti-terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based
Charities, 71 Fed. Reg. 63,838 (Dep’t of the Treasury Oct. 31, 2006).
28. John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Council on
Foreign Relations (Feb. 10, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2003
/021003agcouncilonforeignrelation.htm.
29. See generally DAVID COLE AND JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA
IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007) (cataloguing compromises on the rule of law
prompted by Bush administration measures in the “war on terror”).
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future. As such, these statutes permit a kind of de facto preventive
detention, implemented through the rubric of the criminal law.
The material support statutes raise a host of constitutional
problems, both in terms of how groups and individuals get
designated as terrorist in the first place, and with respect to the
sanctions then imposed on anyone who supports a designated entity.
The initial designation process is a largely secret administrative
process. Groups first learn that they have been designated as a
terrorist group through a notice published in the Federal Register.
Groups and individuals overseas may be listed without any notice or
opportunity to respond whatsoever. Groups and individuals in the
United States are entitled by due process to some notice and
opportunity to respond, but the opportunity is largely a sham; groups
are not permitted to confront their accusers, are not provided a
hearing, and are typically designated on the basis of secret evidence
that they have no chance to see or rebut. Designations are simply
announced, and the government publishes no statement of reasons
or explanation for why any particular entity was designated
A designated entity may bring a challenge to its designation in
court. But it cannot introduce any evidence in that challenge, and it
generally cannot see the government’s evidence, which if classified is
presented to the judge behind closed doors and outside the presence
of the designated entity or its lawyers.
Not surprisingly, no
organization has successfully challenged its designation as a terrorist
group.
I am currently representing a group that has not yet been
designated but is under investigation for possible designation, and I
will describe briefly the process that we have been through. About
two years ago, the federal government shut down the organization,
froze all its assets, and seized all its documents and records. It did so
without any finding—or even allegation—of wrongdoing. The fact of
the investigation was enough.
Because this is an American group, as noted above, it is entitled to
some notice, and to submit in writing materials in its defense. To
that end, the government produced a short stack of documents that it
said constituted its “administrative record” regarding the
organization. Approximately 95 percent of the documents do not
even name the organization that we are representing. There are
indictments of other organizations, and miscellaneous documents
referring to other organizations. But there is no explanation as to
what these documents have to do with our client, or of what, if
anything, our client is alleged to have done to warrant being placed
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under investigation. We are left to guess in the dark at the
government’s concerns.
But it is worse than that. The government has also informed us
that it is relying on classified evidence that it cannot tell us about. So
we must defend the group without knowing the accusations against it,
and without seeing most of the evidence in the file.
We do have an opportunity to submit whatever we want—in
writing—in our defense. The only problem is that we do not know
what the charges are, what the evidence is, and they have all our
documents. (Laughter) So we wrote to them and said, “We would
actually like to get access to our own documents so that we might
prepare a defense.” They replied that the U.S. Attorney sees those,
not Treasury, so you will have to deal with the U.S. Attorney. When
we wrote to the U.S. Attorney, he said, “I do not have any interest in
the Treasury Department and so I am not going to let you see the
documents.” So much for due process in the designation of terrorist
30
groups.
The second set of constitutional issues raised by the material
support statutes relates to the prohibitions on support that are
triggered by a designation. The principal concern here is that
because the prohibition on “material support” is so sweeping, it
effectively imposes guilt by association. An example is another case I
am handling. I represent the Humanitarian Law Project, a thirtyyear-old human rights group in Los Angeles, which has been working
with the Kurds in Turkey for a long time. The Kurds are a muchabused group in Turkey. The Humanitarian Law Project was working
with them to teach them how to advocate for human rights, for
example, training them in petitioning the United Nations, going to
31
In
the Human Rights Committee, and putting forward a case.
particular, the Project worked with the Kurdistan Workers Party
because it is the principal political representative of the Kurds in
Turkey. In 1997, however, the United States designated the
Kurdistan Workers Party as a terrorist organization. It then became a
crime for my clients to continue to teach the Kurdistan Workers Party
how to advocate for human rights. Even though my clients had no
intention of furthering terrorism, even though they were actually
seeking to discourage a resort to violence by encouraging the use of
30. In May 2007, the government provided us with a DVD containing copies of
the organization’s seized records – but it did so under a protective order barring us
from sharing the documents with our clients absent another court order. Thus, the
government’s position is that the clients cannot even review their own documents for
their defense without getting specific document-by-document permission.
31. E.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2007).
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peaceful means to resolve conflicts, that is no defense. Material
support is prohibited regardless of its purpose, and is defined to
include all “training,” all “expert advice and assistance,” and all
“services” of any kind whatsoever. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has declared these aspects of the material
support statute unconstitutional, finding that they are hopelessly
vague and potentially criminalize a wide range of speech and
associational activities.
The material support statutes raise First and Fifth Amendment
concerns. The First Amendment guarantees the right to associate
with groups that engage in both lawful and unlawful activity, as long
as one does not intentionally further their unlawful activities. And
yet these statutes do not in any way distinguish between support that
is designed to further illegal activities and support that is designed to
further legal activities.
Second, these statutes raise concerns of vagueness and
overbreadth. What do the prohibitions on training, expert advice
and assistance, or services really bar? If they are as broad as they
seem, then they are constitutionally overbroad, because they prohibit
virtually all First Amendment activity in support of one of these
organizations. The government tries to avoid that conclusion by
contending that individuals are not prohibiting advocacy “on behalf
of” a designated organization. But at the same time, the government
maintains that the prohibition on providing “services” encompasses
anything done “for the benefit of” the organization. So one can
advocate on behalf of a group, but if it turns out that one was
advocating “for the benefit of” the group, a crime has been
committed. And if one thinks his advocacy is on behalf of, but the
jury finds that it was actually for the benefit of, he may go to jail for
fifteen years.
These laws—imposed in secret designation processes, and carrying
sweeping criminal prohibitions—cause a tremendous chilling effect
throughout the Muslim community. As these laws demonstrate, the
preventive paradigm pushes the government to sweep broadly
because it does not know where the threat lies, and it is so afraid of
the threat that it is willing to impose penalties on a broad spectrum of
actors. I do not think that is a very effective strategy for a variety of
reasons that I would be happy to go into in question-and-answer, but
I am certain that it is an unconstitutional strategy. Thank you very
much.
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III. PANEL: CENSORING AND PROSECUTING THE PRESS—AN
ASSESSMENT OF REPORTERS’ SHIELD LEGISLATION
A. Steven D. Clymer∗
I would like to start by thanking the American University Law Review,
and the American Civil Liberties Union for inviting me to participate
in this panel. It is a real privilege to be involved in issues that are as
timely and as important as those that are being discussed here.
As the agenda indicates, I have two careers. I am a professor of law
at Cornell Law School, and I am also a federal prosecutor with the
Department of Justice. In connection with the latter position, I want
to make one thing clear. What I say today is my own opinion, not the
position of the Department of Justice. That is a very important point
because if I say anything that you think is intelligent or insightful,
please give me full credit and not the Department of Justice.
(Laughter)
I want to be a little different than the other speakers here today.
Most of the speakers, with the exception of Jim Tucker, have taken a
position consistent with the ACLU’s position on the topic. He played
devil’s advocate for us. I am not going to play devil’s advocate; I am
going to be the devil’s advocate. (Laughter) I am going to tell you
that the ACLU position on the reporters’ privilege is misguided for a
number of reasons. I am going to give you five reasons why I think it
is wrong. I will try to be brief because I would like to give you all an
opportunity to persuade me that I am wrong or to tell me that I am
right.
My first point has to do with the title of this panel. This panel is
entitled “Censoring and Prosecuting the Press.” That title really
bothers me because the issues about the reporters’ privilege have
nothing to do with either press censorship or with prosecuting the
members of the press. Characterizing it that way may be a nice
rhetorical flourish, but it distorts, rather than illuminates the issues
that we ought to be talking about. What is at issue with reporters’
privilege is something quite different. At issue is whether reporters
should have a privilege, not available to most other witnesses, to
refuse lawful court orders that they testify before a grand jury or
before a court.

∗ Professor of Law (on leave), Cornell Law School; United States Attorney’s
Office, Northern District of New York; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1983; B.A., Cornell
University, 1980.
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In the case of most witnesses, when they get a court order to testify
they must testify or go to jail. They must testify even if that testimony
may embarrass them, humiliate them, if it may be against their
interest, or if it may incriminate their family members or their
friends. That is the rule for everybody in this country. The objective
of the reporters’ privilege is to treat reporters differently. My first
point is that we must be honest about what we are talking about. We
are talking about whether we should carve out a special legal rule that
applies to reporters, but does not apply to most other witnesses.
As I understand it, the argument for this special privilege is not to
benefit reporters, nor to benefit their sources. The argument is that
it will benefit the public because it will increase the free flow of
information to the public. That argument has two steps. Step one
notes that confidential sources are the lifeblood of a free,
independent, and vigorous press. Without confidential sources,
reporters are reduced to simply regurgitating official versions of news
events, versions that may be incomplete or inadequate. I agree
wholeheartedly with that opinion. I do not take issue with the claim
that confidential sources are essential in a free country and that the
press must be able to rely on confidential sources.
It is the second step in the argument where there is a problem.
The second step of the argument states that unless reporters can give
their sources absolute, unqualified assurances of confidentiality,
those sources will no longer give information to reporters. My
second point is that this proposition is not supported by any solid
empirical evidence. There is no proof that a federal journalists’
privilege is necessary to persuade sources to leak information. To put
it differently, there is no evidence that the absence of such a
privilege, which has been the law for years and years, prevents sources
from coming forward.
Today Congressman Pence reminded us about the Watergate leak
and recalled how important that leak was. He asserted that the law
was different then. He was flat out wrong about that; the law was not
different. The law at that time was the same as the current law. The
Supreme Court has never recognized a First Amendment privilege or
a common-law privilege in the context of criminal investigations or
grand-jury investigations. Congress has never recognized a federal
reporters’ privilege, so the law has not changed.
Yet for many years, including very recently, we have had extremely
important leaks. In fact, even with the prominence of the reporters’
privilege in the news reports, we have seen some of the most
important leaks in decades come very recently, including leaks about
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secret CIA prisons in Europe, leaks about warrantless wiretapping,
and leaks about abuses at Abu Ghraib prison. The absence of a
federal reporters’ privilege did nothing to deter those sources from
leaking that very important information, and nothing to keep you,
the public, from getting that information. My second point is that it
is not clear that an absolute guarantee of confidentiality is necessary
to have sources leak information. This makes sense because there is
an extremely small possibility that a reporter will be subpoenaed to
give testimony about the source. Not only is it very unlikely to
happen, but in fact, many sources may never even ask for that sort of
assurance. We do not need that sort of assurance to get the free flow
of information to the public.
My third point is that at the same time a reporters’ privilege is not
necessary, to have it would be very costly. There are real costs in
terms of the loss of reliable, probative evidence to litigants, to courts,
and to grand juries by having a reporters’ privilege. What does that
mean on the ground? It means people who are civil litigants and who
have suffered damages would be unable to make their claims. Steven
Hatfill, whose reputation has been destroyed by leaks in the press,
would be unable to recover despite the fact that those leaks may have
32
violated federal law. It means criminal defendants may be unable to
establish their innocence in court because they cannot gain access to
exculpatory evidence that might be in a reporter’s possession. It
means that grand juries would not be able to solve crimes, and that
courts and trial juries would be denied evidence important to make
decisions about the guilt or innocence of criminal defendants.
My fourth point regards the claim that it is the public that benefits
from the reporters’ privilege. In fact, the party that will benefit
enormously from a reporters’ privilege is the government official who
improperly leaks information in violation of the law. Whether we
want to admit it or not, most whistleblowers are not Good Samaritans.
Many whistleblowers have their own private manipulative agendas for
leaking information to the press. Let me give you some examples.
Suppose as a federal prosecutor, I am doing a criminal
investigation in front of the grand jury and I do not have enough
evidence to indict a person. However, I really want to get this target
because I do not like this target; I think he is a crook, but I am
frustrated because I cannot indict him. So I could pick up my
telephone, call a reporter, and leak secret grand-jury transcripts to
that reporter who could now write a story that would destroy the
32. Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005).
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career or the reputation, or both, of this target. What does a
reporters’ privilege do in this situation? It guarantees that I will never
be prosecuted for that crime. If a congressman, for purely partisan
reasons, wants to leak classified information, perhaps to influence an
election that is coming up, he can now have one of those off-therecord conversations with a reporter. If there is a reporters’ privilege,
he can sleep soundly at night knowing that he is immune from
prosecution.
Why does it immunize a leaker from prosecution? If the
investigators go to the leaker, the leaker can assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege and not have to give any information. The
reporter, if there is a reporters’ privilege, can assert the reporters’
privilege and not have to give any information. If it is a two-party
conversation, there is no other source of information to solve this
crime. The people who will benefit from a reporters’ privilege, other
than supposedly the public, are government officials with access to
secret information who decide to violate the laws and leak that
information for their own personal or political agendas.
Those are my first four points; let me summarize them quickly.
Number one, let us be honest that what we are talking about. It is not
prosecution, it is not censorship; it is whether reporters should enjoy
some special privilege generally unavailable to other witnesses.
Number two, it is not necessary to encourage leaks to have a
reporters’ privilege; leaks occur all the time without the privilege and
have for many years. Number three, a journalist’s privilege is very
costly and it is going to necessarily result in injustices in both the
criminal and civil justice systems. And fourthly, such a privilege will
safeguard government officials who illegally leak information for
their own purposes. I will assume that some, or perhaps even all of
you, are not persuaded by any of those assertions.
I also want to raise a fifth argument. I want to engage you on a
value that I have and I suspect that all of you hold; a value of
protecting the First Amendment. Because you are here at a
conference about the First Amendment, I am going to bet that all of
you value the First Amendment and are interested in protecting the
free flow of information to the public. In other words, you are
opposed to legal rules that prevent information from coming to the
public. I want to persuade you that the reporters’ privilege is that
very thing. The reporters’ privilege is a rule that will deny members
of the public very important information they ought to have,
information about the way the government operates and other
newsworthy stories.
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Here are several potential newsworthy stories. Story number one:
High-level Executive Branch officials conspire together to discredit a
critic of the Administration. As part of their plot, they decide to
selectively leak information, some of which may be classified, to
members of the press. Story number two: A prominent criminal
defense attorney violates a court order and releases secret grand-jury
testimony in violation of the court order, thereby destroying the
reputations of people who gave that grand-jury testimony. In court,
the attorney then falsely denies that he leaked the information and,
in fact, accuses the prosecution of leaking the information, thereby
trying to obstruct justice in a criminal case. Story number three: The
government is investigating a successful scientist as a possible threat
to national security. Before any charges are brought, government
officials leak information about their investigation, which destroys the
career and reputation of the scientist.
I think we could all agree that all three of those stories are stories
you would want to read about in the newspaper; we would want to
know what is going on in those cases. Surely we would want to know
about high-level government officials plotting to discredit a critic, a
rogue criminal defense attorney trying to obstruct justice, and
government officials who leak information to destroy a scientist’s
career without the presence of any charges against him.
You probably have figured out that these stories are all true. The
first story is the Administration’s leak of information about Joseph
Wilson, a former ambassador, who was a critic of the Bush
Administration, in what we now call the Valerie Plame affair. The
second story is the BALCO leak investigation, that Professor Eliason
has written about, where a criminal defense attorney named Troy
Ellerman violated a court order and released grand-jury information.
He then lied about it to the court and obstructed justice when he
accused the government of leaking the information he himself had
leaked. The third story could be the Wen Ho Lee story, who filed a
33
Privacy Act suit because information about his investigation of
stealing secrets about U.S. nuclear arsenals and giving them to China
was leaked, or it could be the Stephen Hatfill story, the scientist who
was suspected in the anthrax mail investigation and has also filed a
Privacy Act suit.
All these stories have something in common. In all these cases, a
well-financed entity has fought tooth and nail to keep information
about these leaks from the public, and consequently has tried to deny
33. Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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the public free access to the information. It was not the government;
it was not criminal defense attorneys; it was the press organizations.
Those organizations tried to conceal the true nature of the
relationship between Administration officials and friendly reporters
in the Plame investigation. They tried to keep the fact that Troy
Ellerman was working with reporters who were fully aware of his
crimes, but yet continued to publish stories and work with him
regarding the disclosed grand-jury information. They have tried to
keep from you the identity and the circumstances of the leaks in Lee
34
35
v. Department of Justice and Hatfill v. New York Times Co. cases. The
tool that the press organizations have used to try to conceal that
information from you is the reporters’ privilege by presenting claims
in court that a reporters’ privilege protects the information.
My final point is that press organizations correctly make the
argument that the substance of leaked information is important for
an educated public. I agree with that, but at the same time, the
circumstances of the leaks and the identity of the leakers are also
important newsworthy facts for the public to know. The reporters’
privilege conceals from the public information about the
circumstances of the leak; what happened, for example, in the Plame
case or the other cases, and the identity of the leakers; things that are
also very newsworthy.
I do not mean to suggest any bad intent or bad motive on the part
of the press. My point is that if our criterion is free flow of
information to the press, there are costs to having a reporters’
privilege and the cost is very high, for two reasons. First, it may
prevent us from holding government officials accountable for their
improper actions. Second, as the BALCO case made very clear, it
may also prevent us from holding the press accountable for its
conduct, from knowing what sort of relationship reporters are
forming with leakers and what sort of guarantees reporters are
making. That information is also important to have in a free society.
Justice Brandeis once said “sunlight is . . . the best of disinfectants”
36
for a government. A journalist’s privilege blocks that sunshine by
preventing the public from knowing about circumstances of leaks
and the identity of leakers. It protects government officials who
make those leaks. As the BALCO case makes clear, sometimes the

34. Lee, 413 F.3d 53.
35. Hatfill, 416 F.3d 320.
36. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(A.M. Kelley 1986) (1914).
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press could use a little sunshine itself, perhaps as a disinfectant. I
thank you for your attention.
IV. PANEL: SURVEILLANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS
A. Jameel Jaffer∗
Let me start by thanking the American University Law Review and my
colleagues in Washington at the ACLU for inviting me to participate
in this conference.
The previous speakers are clearly right that it is impossible to
quantify the chilling effect of government surveillance. But it’s
important to recognize that the chilling effect is not just an
abstraction; it’s very real, especially in minority and immigrant
communities that are already marginalized. When the other panelists
were speaking, I was thinking of a trip I took to Michigan in 2003.
37
We were preparing to file a lawsuit challenging section 215 of the
38
Patriot Act, a surveillance provision that allowed the Federal Bureau
of Investigation unchecked access to records in the hands of political
and advocacy organizations, libraries, bookstores, universities,
hospitals, and Internet service providers. We thought that the
provision was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment
because it allowed the FBI to compel the disclosure of records
without judicial review. We also thought that the provision violated
the First Amendment because it categorically foreclosed any
organization that received a section 215 order from disclosing to any
39
other person that the FBI had served the order.
We went to
Michigan to meet with representatives of Muslim and Arab-American
community organizations that were concerned about the Patriot Act
and that had expressed an interest in challenging section 215’s
constitutionality.
The thing I remember most vividly from that trip is how difficult it
was to persuade the individual members of the community
organizations to talk to us. It wasn’t that they weren’t supportive of
our work. They were. But they were afraid of attracting attention.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service had rounded up
∗ Director, American Civil Liberties Union’s National Securities Project; J.D.,
Harvard Law School.
37. Muslim Cmty. Ass’n v. Ashcroft, No. 03-CV-72913 (E.D. Mich. filed July 30,
2003).
38. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 215, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1861-1862 (2008).
39. Id. § 1861(a)(1).
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hundreds of Muslim men and held them without charges for months.
Many of these men had been deported after secret hearings. The
people we approached hadn’t done anything wrong, but they were
afraid that participating in a lawsuit, or even talking to the ACLU,
could lead to similar consequences for themselves or their families.
When we did manage to persuade some of these people to talk to us,
they told us of the effect that the government’s policies had had on
their own activities.
They had stopped going to political
demonstrations, stopped writing letters to the newspapers, stopped
giving money to their mosques. They assumed—or at least feared—
that the government was keeping track of everything. A doctor in his
fifties told us that he had advised his son, a second-year university
student, not to major in politics and not to join the Muslim Students
Association because he thought that doing these things would invite
government scrutiny.
I don’t know how to reduce this kind of thing to a statistic. It’s
what I think of, though, when people suggest that the chilling effect
is insignificant or overstated.
The truth is that government
surveillance can have a profound chilling effect on individuals’
willingness to engage in activities that are protected by the First
Amendment—activities that are necessary to the functioning of any
democracy.
And this chilling effect falls most squarely on
communities that are already marginized.
There’s a long line of cases in which the Supreme Court has
recognized that the threat of government surveillance can discourage
legitimate political association, legitimate religious activity, and
legitimate political dissent. Here’s what Justice Powell wrote in the
40
Keith case:
History abundantly documents the tendency of government—
however benevolent and benign its motives—to view with suspicion
those who most fervently dispute its policies. . . . [T]he price of
lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an
unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized
official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion
of Government action in private conversation. For private dissent,
41
no less than open discourse, is essential to our free society.

The Keith case involved warrantless wiretaps; the question was
whether such wiretaps were permissible if conducted for domestic
intelligence purposes. But the Court has recognized the connection
between surveillance and the First Amendment in other contexts as
40. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
41. Id. at 314.
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42

well. In NAACP v. Alabama and several other cases decided in the
1950s and 1960s, the Court recognized that government access to the
membership lists of political associations was likely to discourage
43
people from joining those organizations. Similarly, in United States
44
v. Rumely, the Court recognized that government access to bookpurchase records was likely to discourage people from buying
controversial books.
One important insight from these cases is that, from a First
Amendment perspective, the threat of government surveillance can be
just as problematic—just as inhibiting of constitutionally protected
activity—as the surveillance itself. Incidentally, it was that same
insight that animated Jeremy Bentham’s famous Panopticon, a prison
that allowed a single guard, located in the center of the prison, to see
into every cell. The single guard could not possibly monitor all of the
prisoners at once, but Bentham understood that prisoners would be
intimidated and pacified by the mere possibility that the guard might
be monitoring them. From a First Amendment perspective, the
problem with unchecked government surveillance is not just the
surveillance itself; it’s also the possibility—the threat—of surveillance.
The chilling effect doctrine reflects a similar insight. In Rumely, the
Supreme Court’s concern was not solely with the people who had
already purchased controversial books and whose identities the
government sought to obtain, but also with those who might be
discouraged from purchasing controversial books because of the
threat of future surveillance. In his concurrence, Justice Douglas
wrote, “Once the government can demand of a publisher the names
of the purchasers of his publications, the free press as we know it
disappears. Then the spectre of a government agent will look over the shoulder
45
of everyone who reads.” Justice Douglas was concerned not just about
the surveillance that the government was actually conducting but also
about the surveillance that it could conduct—not just about the
government agent but about the “spectre” of the agent as well.
It’s helpful to have that background in mind when you think about
the surveillance cases that are in the courts now, and in particular the
42. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
43. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (“Inviolability of privacy in
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of
freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”); see
also Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544, 556–58
(1963) (holding that there was not enough evidence of communist sympathy within
the Miami chapter of the NAACP to override the privacy afforded to the group by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
44. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
45. Id. at 57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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cases relating to the National Security Agency’s warrantless
wiretapping program. One difference between these new cases and
many of the cases that were decided in the 1960s and 70s—cases like
Keith, NAACP v. Alabama, and Rumely—is that the new cases involve a
program whose specific targets are unknown. We know how the NSA
program works, of course; the New York Times (and later the President)
explained that the program involves the warrantless interception of emails and telephone calls that originated or terminated inside the
United States. But we don’t know whose communications have been
intercepted under the program because the government refuses to
say. The question before the courts is whether plaintiffs who are
unable to show with certainty that their communications have been
intercepted under the program can establish standing by
demonstrating that the program has had a chilling effect on their
First Amendment activity.
As some of you know, this question is a hotly contested one.
Everyone agrees, of course, that a litigant can’t invoke the jurisdiction
of a federal court without first showing that he or she has been
46
injured by the government’s conduct.
There is disagreement,
though, about what should count as an injury in this context. Some
appellate courts have said that the only injury that counts is actual
interception. With something like the NSA program, however, a
showing of actual interception is nearly impossible for plaintiffs to
make.
I’ve been litigating one of these NSA cases since early 2006. After
the President acknowledged the existence of the NSA program, we
filed a lawsuit against the NSA on behalf of a coalition of journalists,
47
The plaintiffs were
researchers, and criminal defense attorneys.
people whose work required them to engage in sensitive
communications with witnesses, experts, clients, and sources located
overseas. The plaintiffs couldn’t show with certainty that their
communications had been intercepted by the NSA, but they could
show that the NSA program had inhibited them from engaging in
constitutionally protected activity. The journalists could show that
the program had prevented them from gathering information from
sources in Afghanistan and Iraq. The lawyers could show that the
46. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“A federal court’s jurisdiction
therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered ‘some
threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action . . . .’”)
(citation omitted).
47. ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Central Sec. Serv., 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D.
Mich. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1334 (2008).
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program had prevented them from gathering information from
witnesses in Israel and Palestine. Because they feared that their
communications were being monitored by the NSA, some of the
plaintiffs had traveled to the Middle East to gather information that
they would otherwise have been able to gather over the telephone or
by e-mail. To our plaintiffs, the threat of surveillance was just as
harmful as the surveillance itself; they had had to adjust their
behavior to address the possibility that the government might be
monitoring their calls. We argued, relying in part on Keith, NAACP v.
Alabama, and Rumely, that the harm that the NSA program had
caused to our plaintiffs constituted an injury sufficient to establish
standing.
The district court agreed with us that we had established standing,
and it held that the NSA’s program violated statutory law as well as
the First and Fourth Amendments. We fared less well, though, in the
Sixth Circuit. Two members of the panel found that our plaintiffs
did not have standing to sue because they could not prove that their
communications had been monitored by the NSA. Those judges also
held that the government could properly rely on the state secrets
privilege to justify its refusal to disclose whether our plaintiffs had
been monitored. (The third member of the panel found that we had
established standing and agreed with the district court that the NSA
program was unlawful.)
Needless to say, I think the Sixth Circuit majority got it wrong. For
one thing, the consequence of the rule adopted by the Sixth Circuit
is that the government can insulate its surveillance programs from
judicial scrutiny simply by refusing to disclose who its surveillance
targets have been. The Sixth Circuit’s rule is also inconsistent with a
key insight of cases like Keith, NAACP v. Alabama, and Rumely—that
the harm to First Amendment rights flows not just from surveillance
itself but from the threat of surveillance. The First Amendment
implications are the same, maybe even more severe, when there’s
uncertainty about who the government is monitoring.
To say that the only people who can challenge government’s
surveillance are those who can prove they were actually monitored is
to ignore the corrosive effect that the mere threat of surveillance can
have on First Amendment rights. It is not true that the only people
injured by government surveillance programs are those who can
prove they were targeted individually. Unchecked government
surveillance has a broader chilling effect, as the Supreme Court has
recognized. If the freedoms of speech, association, and religion are
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to be preserved, I think it’s critical that this broader effect not be
ignored or underestimated by the lower courts.
V. PANEL: SECRECY AND BARRIERS TO OPEN GOVERNMENT
A. Glenn M. Sulmasy∗
The United States’ response to 9/11 presents unique challenges to
maintaining the ever-delicate balance between a citizen’s right to
know and a government’s right to conduct its affairs in the most
efficient and expeditious manner possible. The current debate on
this issue is incredibly polarized, and can generally be broken down
into two camps: those who view the conflict as a “Global War on
Terror” requiring greater government secrecy; and those who see it
as a law enforcement action subject to the normal obligations of
openness and accountability. In this Essay, I articulate a “third way”
of viewing the current conflict, one that justifies greater government
secrecy but in such a way that begins by acknowledging basic human
rights and civil liberties.
The current debates on balancing privacy and national security,
and other debates associated with our current conflict, strongly
diverge and become polarized depending upon the paradigm from
which one views the current conflict: whether the war against al
Qaeda necessitates a law of war analysis or a law enforcement
response. In contrast with most of the panelists at the Symposium, I
do view the current struggle as an armed conflict. However, I view
48
the armed conflict as, and only refer to it as, the “War on al Qaeda.”
It is truly not a war on terror.
The phrase “Global War on Terror” is a confusing misnomer.
Critically, we can never defeat terrorism, per se. We are not fighting
the IRA, the Red Brigades, the Shining Path, or Hamas. Rather, our
struggle is focused on a single terrorist network, an identifiable
enemy, al Qaeda.

∗ Glenn M. Sulmasy is on the law faculty of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and
is a national security and human rights fellow at Harvard University. This essay was
developed from a speech he delivered as part of the Symposium, “Left Out in the
Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America,”
sponsored by the Washington College of Law and the American Civil Liberties Union
in September 2007. The views expressed herein are his own and should not in any
way be construed as the views of the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S.
Coast Guard, or the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.
48. See generally Glenn Sulmasy, The War on al Qaeda, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20, 2007,
at B7 (arguing that the United States should realign its mission and focus by relabeling the “war on terror” as the “war against al Qaeda”).
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The “war on terror” label has led many scholars, practitioners, and
policy makers to be justifiably suspicious of the Administration’s
motives. Because of the ambiguous and broad title, many have
legitimately questioned whether it is the Administration’s intent to
call the conflict a “Global War on Terror” to extraordinarily increase
49
Some critics also claim that this conflict was
executive power.
labeled a war to unnecessarily, arbitrarily, or even illegally keep
secrets from the citizenry. I truly do not believe that is the case, but I
can understand how these criticisms emerge.
The title we give to the current conflict matters a great deal. It
impacts strategy, tactics, and the laws used to govern the conflict. A
war without end should give pause to all of us—most importantly to
those who have committed to serving in the armed forces of the
United States. In addition, unlimited periods of war or national
emergency are normally associated with curtailing of civil liberties
and creating the environment for potential abuse of power and the
opportunity for a government to commit myriad human rights
violations. Thus, the need for long-term government secrecy, as part
of a permanent war on terror, seems contrary to traditional American
values.
The name “Global War on Terror” sounds an awful lot like former
President Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” and the President
Reagan/Bush “War on Drugs.” Without question, these are noble,
national ambitions but they are not armed conflicts. Critics have
used this similarity to argue that, like the “wars” on poverty and
drugs, the “Global War on Terror” is nothing more than a title given
to show the level of national effort and resource commitment to the
struggle. Because these “efforts” have not triggered the employment
of a law of war legal regime, neither should the current conflict with
al Qaeda.
However, these previous national campaigns were not armed
conflicts. The current struggle against international terrorism is
clearly some form of armed conflict. In reality, it a mixture of
traditional warfare and law enforcement—it is a hybrid armed
49. Various academics, members of the media, and critics of the Administration
have asserted many of the decisions made by the Bush Administration have been part
of an orchestrated effort to enhance executive power—and implement the idea of
the “Unitary Executive.” See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and the Nature of
Executive Authority: The Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L.
REV. 871, 872–73 (2007) (discussing President Bush’s assertions of broad executive
power); Dana Milbank, In Cheney’s Shadow, Counsel Pushes the Conservative Cause,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2004, at A21 (remarking that notions of the unitary executive
theory can be found in the White House memorandum justifying torture of
terrorism suspects).
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conflict. Every day, our men and women in uniform are fighting on
numerous fronts against an enemy who has declared war on the
United States. The American response to the 9/11 attacks by al
Qaeda have utilized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the
National Security Agency (“NSA”), and the Central Intelligence
Agency (“CIA”) in greater prominence than ever before.
Thus, by calling the current conflict the “War on al Qaeda,” we can
give a face to our enemy and create a framework for victory. It helps
ensure this will be a finite war with a decreased likelihood of abuse of
power. This conflict label also provides a more workable framework
for justifying secrecy in many areas of governmental activity when
fighting al Qaeda and international terrorism—distinct from strictly
domestic law enforcement operations.
Having declared that we are engaged in an armed conflict, we now
turn to the other side of the equation and determine what universally
accepted human rights are impacted by secrecy during wartime. As
we approach the anniversary of that wonderful, aspirational
50
document, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”
or “Declaration”), the United States and the West currently struggle
to promote peace and national security while still supporting the
notions of human rights within the world community. Adopted on
December 10, 1948, well ahead of its time, the Declaration asserted
51
various commonly understood human rights.
Specifically at issue at our Symposium is the citizens’ “right to
know,” which is largely extrapolated from the second clause of Article
52
53
19 and Article 21 of the Declaration. Clearly, it is a vital and
universally accepted principle that a government should operate in
the open and not in secrecy. It is a universally recognized human
right for citizens to be able to fully participate in their government.
Many will construe this, if not covered separately in treaties they are
parties to, as having become customary international law.
This right, however, is appropriately cast against the legitimate
needs of the government to act without public comment or
participation during times of armed conflict or emergency. It is a
50. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
51. See, e.g., id. art. 3–5 (stating rights to life, liberty, and security of person while
proscribing persons from being subjected slavery or inhuman treatment or
punishment).
52. See id. art. 19, cl. 2 (“[The right to freedom of opinions and expression]
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive[,] and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”).
53. See id. art. 21 (providing for the right to take part in the government of one’s
country and the right to equal access to public service in one’s country).
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delicate balancing test. In peacetime, the public’s right to know what
their government is doing is essential and has been an integral part
of the American way of governing since our founding in the
eighteenth century. During times of war, however, the scales tip in
favor of the government.
Many today suggest that the scales have tipped too far in favor of
54
the government, but history reveals similar patterns. Even in the
post-Second World War era (post-UDHR), the U.S. government,
regardless of party affiliation, maintained a strong pro-secrecy stance.
In wartime, secrecy is critical to mission success. It has always been
that way and will continue to be that way into the foreseeable future.
Once a nation commits to go to war—any war—it is empirically true
that the government waging war will seek heightened levels of
secrecy. Thus, if the war on al Qaeda is an armed conflict, the
balance (as has historically been the case) shifts to the government
for the duration of the conflict.
An acceptance of greater government secrecy is a tacit part of the
decision making when any democratic nation commits to engage in
armed conflict. The great warrior Sun Tzu wrote, “what enables the
wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and
achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is
55
foreknowledge.”
It has certainly been that way throughout
American history. From the American Revolution, to our Civil War,
to the Second World War, to the invasion of Grenada, and through
our current armed conflict, we have never been naïve: We have
always entered these wars knowing that increased secrecy would be a
critical element for our success.
Even the great liberal champion of human rights and the
founder most supportive of the dignity of humanity, Thomas
Jefferson, understood the need for secrecy in general (and
particularly in wartime). Actually, Jefferson was concerned about
sharing the secrets of the executive with Congress—let alone the
54. Oversight Hearing on Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
(Jan. 29, 2008) (statement of H. Thomas Wells, Jr., President-Elect, American Bar
Association) (“More searching judicial review, informed by evidence, would ensure
that government assertions of necessity are truly warranted and not simply a means
to avoid embarrassment or accountability.”). Also, look to the recent debate and
congressional hearings on the necessity of classifying the OLC 2003 memo stating
that criminal laws would not apply to interrogators if they acted to “prevent further
attacks.” Recent testimony on this issue can be found in the April 30 Hearing before
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property
Rights.
55. SUN TZU, ON THE ART OF WAR 59 (Lionel Giles trans., Allandale Online
Publishing 2000) (1910).
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56

media and general public. This need for governmental secrecy was
even more pressing for Jefferson when it related to intelligence
gathering.
Ben Franklin expressed similar sentiments in 1776. While leading
the Committee of Secret Correspondence for the Continental
Congress, Franklin asserted the unanimous opinion of the
Committee that they could not share sensitive secrets about a French
covert operation to assist the Revolution because “[w]e find by fatal
57
experience Congress consists of too many members to keep secrets.”
This sounds awfully familiar, no?
Thus, the founders, as well as many modern administrations in
both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, have strongly insisted
that the media, the citizenry, and even Congress are presumptively
not privy to most wartime secrets and intelligence activities. The
situation should be no different in this War against al Qaeda. In
many respects, certainly tactically and strategically, secrecy may be
perhaps even more important. This need for secrecy is even more
pressing given the twenty-four-hour media coverage that is now an
integral part of society. The key remains, however, to not abuse such
discretion and ensure the public remains aware of the myriad secret
operations as soon as practicable without impeding mission
accomplishment or compromising legitimate intelligence collection.
Thus, such “secrecy” is critical; the burden remains on the executive
branch to be ever mindful of its obligations to be open and
transparent with the electorate as soon as hostilities cease or when
practicable and reasonable.
As explained in Part II, the conflict with al Qaeda that began on
September 11, 2001 defies traditional classification. The al Qaeda
fighter does not fit comfortably into either category of criminal or of
warrior; he is truly a mix. Additionally, we are fighting this battle with
58
a combination of law enforcement and warfare techniques.
Determining the appropriate balance between the government’s

56. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Powers of the Senate (Apr. 24, 1790), in
THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA (John P. Foley ed., 1900) (“The Senate is not supposed
by the Constitution to be acquainted with the concerns of the Executive Department.
It was not intended that these should be communicated to them.”).
57. Wartime Executive Power and the NSA’s Surveillance Authority II: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15 (2006) (testimony of Robert F. Turner,
Associate Director, Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia) (quoting
Franklin).
58. See generally Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Legal Landscape After Hamdan: The
Creation of Homeland Security Courts, 13 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2006) (arguing
for the adoption of homeland security courts that would function as a hybrid of
military commissions and Article III federal courts).
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need for secrecy and the citizen’s right to know therefore requires
recognition of the hybrid nature of the conflict.
This armed conflict, by its asymmetric nature, is one where
intelligence gathering is a major part of military operations. Even
more so than in past conflicts, aggressive intelligence collection is
critical in this struggle. Thus, the government through its various
agencies involved in fighting this war (the Department of Justice,
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency) needs
secrecy more than ever in order to best protect the homeland. The
normal Western and U.S. standards for open government and
discussion on the means and methods of such warfare would be
dangerous for our men and women in uniform and likely ensure
defeat at the hands of the al Qaeda fighters.
Therefore, I would suggest that the need for governmental secrecy
in the War on al Qaeda is, by its very nature, greater than before,
since we have no nation state to negotiate with, no traditional means
of waging war—e.g., troop movements, massive invasions, toppling a
government, etc. Preventing attacks from al Qaeda before they occur
59
is the key to success in this conflict. Open dialogue on intelligence
collection and the means and methods employed by our intelligence
professionals would be disastrous for our men and women fighting in
Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as for those protecting the homeland.
Democracies are, and should be, uncomfortable with governmental
secrecy. The United States has traditionally been a nation suspicious
of governmental activity. That is the nature of the American psyche.
However, in times of war or armed conflict—such as the current
armed conflict with al Qaeda—it remains critical that the government
retains the right to certain levels of secrecy while fighting an enemy.
Thus, although not absolute by any means, the balance between
openness and secrecy necessarily tips toward the government—
especially in this unique twenty-first century war.
B. Erwin Chemerinsky∗
Thank you. It is an honor and a pleasure to be here. The Bush
Administration has been more obsessed with and has invoked more
59. Cf. Richard A. Posner, A New Surveillance Act, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at
A16 (“National security intelligence is a search for the needle in a haystack. The
intelligence services must cast a wide net with a fine mesh to catch the clues that may
enable the next attack to be prevented.”).
∗ Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Duke
University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1978; B.S., Northwestern University,
1975.
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efforts at secrecy than any presidency since Richard Nixon. This has
taken many different forms. For example, not long after 9/11, the
Bush Administration, through a memo by the Chief Immigration
Judge, Michael Creppy, imposed blanket closure of all immigration
60
proceedings of those who were accused of any terrorist activity.
Additionally, what has not had nearly as much publicity was the
attempt by the Bush Administration and the Justice Department to
hold secret trials and proceedings in federal district courts and even
appellate proceedings in the federal court of appeals. These matters
did not appear on any docket. At the Spring 2002 annual conference
of federal defenders, a federal defender said, “I cannot tell you very
much about this, but in our district we have an entirely secret file
going on against somebody that does not appear on any docket at
all.” The next year he said, “[I]t is now in the Eleventh Circuit and it
does not appear on any docket sheet.” I started hearing about these
types of proceedings from other people. Eventually, a letter of
inquiry was sent to then Chief Judge of the Southern District of New
York, Judge Mukasey, by the Legal Director of the ACLU, Stephen
Shapiro. Judge Mukasey responded by saying, “Unfortunately, or
should I say fortunately, I cannot tell you anything about this.”
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press found dozens
of instances of entirely secret proceedings that did not appear on any
docket in the federal district court here in the District of Columbia
alone. Additionally, there have been changes of policies with regard
61
to the Freedom of Information Act, and things that were previously
open to the public are no longer being made public.
One part of this secrecy piece is executive privilege. I want to talk
about a couple of things with regard to executive privilege. First, I
will talk about the general law regarding executive privilege. Second,
I will discuss how this Administration has used executive privilege.
Regarding the law of executive privilege, it might surprise you to
know, there have only been two Supreme Court cases in history that
have dealt with executive privilege in any detail. The first, and
62
unquestionably the most important, was United States v. Nixon in
1974. Leon Jaworski, Special Prosecutor during the Watergate
Scandal, subpoenaed tapes of White House conversations to use in
the prosecution of those who had been involved in the Watergate
60. Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All
Immigration Judges and Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf.
61. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2008).
62. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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cover-up. President Nixon invoked executive privilege in an effort to
keep the tapes secret. District court Judge John Sirica ruled against
the President, and the case then went to the United States court of
appeals. Before the court of appeals could issue a decision, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and took up the case.
63
The Brethren:
Inside the Supreme Court, by Woodward and
Armstrong, is a fascinating story about how the opinion was drafted.
It tells the story of how then Chief Justice Burger assigned himself to
write the opinion, and when the other Justices saw his opinion they
determined that it would not receive a passing grade in law school, so
they met secretly and parceled out writing the opinion amongst
themselves. Justice White had the task of writing the part on grandjury proceedings, and he wrote a memo to the other Justices
indicating that Chief Justice Burger wrote a great opinion except for
the part about the grand jury and, therefore, he would substitute it.
It is for this reason that the decision does not read like it was written
by one person. In a vote of eight to zero, the Supreme Court ruled
against the President; Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the
decision because he had been an Assistant Attorney General in the
Nixon Justice Department.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Nixon, determined that
Presidents have executive privilege and that executive privilege is
important because it preserves the confidentiality that is necessary for
candid discussion and advice to the President, especially when
matters of foreign policy are involved. However, the Supreme Court
determined that executive privilege is not absolute. It has to yield
when there is an overriding need for information, such as when the
need for evidence in a criminal trial outweighs executive privilege.
The Court would not allow President Nixon to have executive
privilege here and keep the federal courts from receiving the
evidence necessary to provide due process and fair trials for those
involved in the Watergate cover-up. It decided that the President
cannot invoke executive privilege in a manner that keeps another
branch from fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities. As a result,
Nixon was ordered to produce the tapes. One of the tapes had a very
famous conversation where President Nixon said he would tell the
FBI not to investigate the Watergate break-in because it was a CIA
matter. That, by any definition, is obstruction of justice. When that
came out, Republicans in Congress and Nixon supporters told the
63. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE
COURT (Simon & Schuster 2005) (1979).
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President that he could not go forward, and Nixon announced his
resignation.
The only other major Supreme Court case dealing with executive
64
privilege is Cheney v. United States District Court, involving the energy
policy study group. The case is unusual because of the strange
procedural posture in which it came to the Supreme Court. It was
sufficiently unusual that it is fair to say that pretty much all that is
discussed about executive privilege is dicta in that opinion. But
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court did recognize that there is
executive privilege. He drew a distinction between the need for
evidence in criminal cases and civil proceedings. He said that the
need for evidence in criminal cases was more compelling than in civil
cases, where perhaps more deference is given to the President’s
executive privilege.
Given that background, I can spend a few minutes talking about
how the Bush Administration has used executive privilege. It has
already been alluded to that the Administration did not want the
9/11 Commission to start with, but when it was finally created, they
used executive privilege. The current controversy regarding the Bush
Administration’s use of executive privilege is the refusal of Harriet
Miers and Joshua Bolten to testify. I thought about whether it would
be appropriate, in the context of this conference about civil liberties
and the War on Terrorism, to discuss this issue, but I do think it gives
a sense of the doctrine of executive privilege, and it is typical of many
of the issues with regard to executive privilege that come up in all
contexts.
There has been an attempt by both the House and the Senate
Judiciary Committees to investigate the firing of the United States
Attorneys across the country. The claim is that United States
Attorneys were fired because they were launching investigations that
the Administration wanted to stop or that they refused to initiate
investigations for partisan political reasons. The Administration has
invoked executive privilege to keep Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolten
from testifying. I would suggest that this is a particularly weak case
for executive privilege and a very strong case for congressional access
to the information. We can use this example to get a better sense of
what executive privilege is all about.
Let me give you several reasons why this is a weak case for executive
privilege. First, it is not clear that executive privilege applies here at
all. Both the Nixon and Cheney cases discussed executive privilege as a
64. 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
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protection of confidential communications with the President or Vice
President.
President Bush has said he had no involvement
whatsoever in the firing of the United States Attorneys. A D.C.
65
Circuit case that involved an investigation of Mike Espy stated that if
there is communication that goes on in anticipation of discussions
with the President then that could also be protected, but in the case
of Miers and Bolten there is no reason to believe that these
communications would ultimately be discussed with the President.
And no Supreme Court case or D.C. Circuit case has ever recognized
that executive privilege could be applied to communications that
were not even anticipated to be with the President.
Second, there are technical requirements for the invocation of
executive privilege that have not been met. For example, there are
D.C. Circuit cases that say that privilege logs need to be turned over,
66
even if the privileged information itself is not. The Administration
has refused to even provide those privilege logs. There is some
authority that says it needs to be the President who invokes executive
privilege. The President has not done so here. In the past, when a
witness before Congress has invoked executive privilege, he or she
has personally appeared. Harriet Miers did not even appear before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, notwithstanding the subpoena.
Third, the Executive Branch’s need for secrecy here is minimal.
The need for Executive Branch secrecy is greatest when foreign
policy and national security issues are implicated. In United States v.
Nixon, the Supreme Court stressed that foreign policy and national
security were not involved, and similarly there is no reason to believe
that the firing of the United States Attorneys touches on matters of
foreign policy or national security, nor that it would chill future
communications with the President.
Finally, I think the need for congressional information is great.
The problem arose because an obscure provision in the Patriot Act
renewal gave new authority to the Department of Justice to appoint
interim attorneys (for the remainder of the Bush Administration)
67
without approval by the Senate. Although Congress did change the
law, Congress needs to decide what the appropriate statutory
provision is, and in order to perform its legislative function, full
information is important. There are Supreme Court cases going back
65. In re Espy, 346 F.3d 199 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
66. See, e.g., In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Rm No. 2113, 497
F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3528 (2008).
67. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified in scattered title numbers and sections of the
U.S.C.).
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to at least the early twentieth century, which state that there is a need
for Congress to be able to conduct oversight investigations. United
States v. Nixon stood for the proposition that a President cannot
invoke executive privilege in a way that keeps another branch from
performing its core functions. Here, the Administration does exactly
that.
Interestingly, if President Nixon had invoked executive privilege in
the same way that the Bush Administration has, then there would
have never been the successful hearings held by Senator Sam Ervin in
the Watergate Senate Select Committee in 1973. President Nixon
initially invoked executive privilege because if White House Counsel,
John Dean, was not able to speak then Alexander Butterfield, the
aide who revealed the taping system, would not be able to speak.
However, ultimately the Nixon Administration allowed its officials to
testify.
The irony in the current situation is that the Bush
Administration has said they would allow Miers and Bolten to testify,
but only in closed sessions with no report made and not under oath.
That very allowance undercuts any claim of a need of secrecy. Unlike
the perspective rendered by Commander Glenn Sulmasy, the
Constitution puts the presumption on the side of openness and not
secrecy, even in wartime. Not absolute openness, of course, some
things need to be held secret, but there is a balance. I would like to
conclude with the words of James Madison, who said, “Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance and a people who mean to be their own
governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
68
gives.” And, “[a] popular government, without popular information
or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce, or a tragedy,
69
or perhaps both.”
C. David M. Hardy∗
Good morning. I want to thank American University, the law
school, the American University Law Review, and particularly the ACLU
for inviting me here today. I am going to talk about the FBI’s policy
70
of processing Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and Privacy

68. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/madison_papers/index.html (search
“Search this collection” for “W.T. Barry;” follow “James Madison to W.T. Barry,
August 4, 1822” hyperlink).
69. Id.
∗ Chief, Records/Information Dissemination Section, Records Management
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
70. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2008).
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Act requests. These Acts provide the framework for one of the
precepts of an open government—access to agency records. The
statute is a balance between complete disclosure of agency records
and recognizing agency equities. Agency equities are those things
that, from the agency’s perspective, are necessary to not disclose to
the public in order to accomplish the agency’s mission. The FBI’s
policy, as an intelligence and law enforcement agency, regarding
what can be withheld and released is divided into two basic areas.
The first area is the bureau’s determination on the use of
exemptions, based largely on the interest of the agency. This is
probably the closest to a policy formulation process. The second is
the reality of processing FOIA requests, which can actually impact
what the requester receives or agency responsiveness to requests.
This second point is a pragmatic, rather than academic, endeavor,
but it does affect what information the agency is able to provide.
Regarding FBI policy, it is common sense what information the FBI
deems important to protect from release. For example, information
necessary to protect national security, sensitive information,
information about ongoing investigations, information that would
allow individuals to circumvent investigations, sensitive techniques,
identification of law enforcement officers, and privacy of third
parties—all are strong FBI equities. We feel strongly about ensuring
that we protect this information before it is released. We, of course,
use all the other FOIA exemptions that are written into the statute, as
well as those categories of information protected by other statutes.
How does the agency find this balance? Well, we first use the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Freedom of Information Act
72
Guide —the lavender book—that provides a summary of the case law
from DOJ’s perspective. It used to be the orange book, which was
easy to describe, but I’m not sure what we call it now. If you are a
FOIA practitioner, it is the equivalent of your red book of Mao
sayings. Although the FBI uses the guide, there are also at any given
time about one hundred cases in federal court involving the FBI, and
that precedent is followed as it is decided.
The courts are
instrumental in drawing the balance between the interests of agency
and requester as to where the FBI sets the redaction standard.
This is a fairly settled area of law, which provides one of the
keystones from which the agency and the requester can predict to a
certain degree what is going to occur in any given situation.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
72. OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVACY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT GUIDE (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_guide07.htm.
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Occasionally, a judge will use equitable principles when making a
decision, then at some point either the judge or his law clerk will
actually read the statute and the case law and usually make a
reconsideration in the FBI’s favor. Of course certain circuits are
always exciting, it is unclear where they are going to go, but on the
whole it is a settled area.
Most of the time when the FBI is spanked in a court opinion, it is
because the FBI did not fully explain the rationale for the redactions.
Since I am one of the authors working on the declarations, I have to
take one of the hits in those areas. From the FBI’s perspective, it is a
little bit like having to go into overtime at a football game. It was not
won within the official time, but there is another chance to re-write it,
and the FBI will go ahead and put in more focused effort and do
what the judge said in order to prevail at that point. The foundation
of success in our declarations is all predicated upon being able to
describe a particular harm.
The process is equally pragmatic within the FBI. Within the
agency, the FBI discusses the possible harm with our operational
divisions because the harm has to be articulable and not speculative.
The operational people review the information and with their
assistance, by looking at the case law, and looking at the subject
matter involved, the FBI will use an exemption for particular
information.
The side that people never really seem to grasp is the influence of
processing factors in FOIA litigation and FOIA appeals. Many think
that the FBI does not look deeply enough within the records for
information and that it operates too slowly. Actually, there is truth to
the statement that the FBI is too slow, but that will be discussed
below. Although one can discuss theory or basic concepts, the
bottom line is that there are three factors affecting the processing
policy. The first is the reality of resources. The second is a constant
need to balance speed versus accuracy, and the third, is the laws of
physics.
The resource issue is fairly clear, and will not be elaborated upon.
Obviously, agencies have to balance the amount of resources they put
into the Freedom of Information Act program with what they need to
accomplish their mission; it is a closed environment. If one hundred
FOIA analysts are added, that results in the removal of fifty or sixty
counterintelligence analysts. Therefore, agencies have to make a
balancing decision regarding that issue. Regarding the second
element, the FBI devotes a considerable number of people, over two
hundred, to Freedom of Information Act work. However, the
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number of incoming requests is huge. The agency receives an
average of 1,500 requests per month, and while about 400 actually
generate real records, all 1,500 have to be searched. These requests
can vary from twenty to thirty to tens of thousands per year. As a
result, it is somewhat like standing underneath the waterfall as these
requests come in, and it is a constant push. There is enormous
pressure, both from the exterior, from the Department of Justice,
from Congress, and from the general public, to process these
requests as quickly as possible.
The FBI puts great emphasis on responding to these requests. The
way to tell what a bureaucracy is going to deem important is by
looking at the bottom line, whether performance in a particular area
is part of management’s performance assessment. As someone who is
in charge of the Freedom of Information Act processing, my
performance evaluation and whether or not I will ever get a bonus, is
based in part on my ability to improve the speed at which requests are
processed. However, speed presents its own problems because when
you try to push things through, accuracy can suffer. If the individual
requester wants a thorough and exhaustive search in every possible
drawer, every possible computer system for anything that remotely
mentions them, this is impossible considering the FBI receives 1,500
requests per month. If the FBI were to search everything in response
to each request, the agency would grind to a halt.
Therefore, the FBI makes policies in order to address this
balancing act. One of the most litigated issues is the search for main
files. When the FBI receives a request, they search the main files and
central indices to see if the individual is in a main file. An individual
may not have a main file but could be named in other FBI records.
But the process of determining whether or not it is in fact that same
individual in another FBI file is very time-consuming. Essentially the
file has to be pulled, put into context, for example, to see if it is
possible that the individual might have lived in Iowa. It takes time.
Therefore, the FBI is always balancing time, how fast it can provide
the information, against providing the major records of an individual.
It is a balancing act that is stated on the FBI webpage.
A main file is opened when an investigation is opened on an
individual. Therefore, when an individual sends in a request stating
that: On December 3, I was arrested at O’Hare Airport because I had
something leaking from my suitcase that alerted people and the FBI
interviewed me, there will not be a main file on the individual, which
means that the FBI never opened an investigation about them.
However, that individual will be in the FBI files and if specific
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information is given in the request, it can be found. On the other
hand, a request for “everything that is on me” or “everything about an
organization and all the cross-references” is a horrendous request.
The third element, the law of physics, relates to the pure reality of
the task. The FBI has over one hundred million files and well over a
billion pages, in 265 locations. Even with automated indices for
everything that occurred after 1995 and manual indices for what
occurred before then, it takes time. That is the law of physics. There
is no way to make such comprehensive searches and maintain the
volume of requests that come in. Another way to look at it is that
either some people are going to be very rich and everyone else is
going to be in complete poverty or the agency can try to spread the
wealth around, which is the approach taken. This pragmatic
viewpoint is the most litigated and affects what information is
available.
The cure would be for all of the federal agencies to make their
records electronic and for the FBI to develop a central repository
where all records from the 265 locations can be brought in and put
into electronic format. The bottom-line is that if the goal is for
greater freedom of information from agencies, there needs to be a
push toward more up-to-date record keeping. It is very expensive,
but it would significantly impact the agency’s ability to find the
records. If there were time and the capacity to identify the
individual, the FBI would provide every reference to the person, but
the reality is that it has neither. Ultimately, when a judge pins the
agency down in litigation, the FBI will go do it. That does not mean
go out and litigate, please. (Laughter) The ACLU provides the FBI
with a good amount. (Laughter) But that is the reality, and that
balancing act is the key ingredient of the FBI’s policy toward
responding to information requests.
VI. PANEL: THE ROLE OF WHISTLEBLOWERS TO FACILITATE
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
A. Valerie Caproni∗
Good morning, everyone. As a current FBI employee, I will talk
about whistleblowing from the agency’s perspective. Panels like this
are best when there is a point—counterpoint. “There absolutely
∗
General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Bureau of
Investigation; J.D., University of Georgia School of Law, 1979; B.A., Newcomb College of
Tulane University, 1976.
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should be a shield law because it is essential to the First Amendment”
versus “A shield law is a terrible idea.” “The President’s Terrorist
Surveillance Program is a gross invasion of American’s institutional
rights.” versus “TSP is an incredibly important program that keeps
the country safe.” I regret to say that on this issue, we will not have
disagreement along those lines. In principle, whistleblowers serve a
useful function in government, and the FBI agrees wholeheartedly
that people who in good faith raise issues and concerns should not be
retaliated against. Criminal conduct, waste, fraud and abuse are not
in the FBI’s best interest, and to the extent such conduct occurs,
management needs to know about it.
Although there is no constitutional protection for a whistleblower,
there is a fairly robust regulatory scheme to protect whistleblowers
within the FBI. The scheme is designed to make sure that
whistleblowers are not retaliated against and to get the information
outside of the FBI to the extent an employee believes they are being
retaliated against. The basic statutory scheme prohibits personnel
73
It
reprisals against anyone for making a protected disclosure.
requires the Attorney General (“AG”) to issue regulations ensuring
that such adverse personnel actions will not happen. In fact, the AG
has issued regulations, and they appear in the Code of Federal
74
Regulations. The scheme that exists for the FBI is very similar to
that which exists for non-intelligence community agencies. One
difference is that whistleblower complaints are considered by the
Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management (“OARM”) rather
than by the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), which is the
federal government agency that protects civil service employees from
adverse personnel actions. OARM, by regulation, is the entity within
the Department of Justice that considers claims of reprisal for the
FBI.
What is protected? An employee can make a protected disclosure,
and therefore, receive protection from reprisal if he or she
reasonably believes there was a violation of a rule, law or regulation,
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or some
substantial and specific danger to public health and safety. Although
the regulations appear to include a very limited number of people to
whom a protected disclosure can be made, the number is actually
fairly large. A protected disclosure can be made to the DOJ, Office of
Professional Responsibility (“OPR”), the DOJ Inspector General
73. 5 U.S.C. § 2303 (2000).
74. 28 C.F.R. § 27 (2008).
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(“IG”), the Attorney General, or the Deputy Attorney General, or you
can go to the FBI Director or the FBI Deputy Director.
For those who do not know the structure of the FBI, within the
agency there is only one political appointee—the Director. The
Deputy Director is a career employee who has risen to the rank of
second in command at the FBI. A whistleblower can go to FBI OPR,
which is headed by a career employee and is responsible for
discipline within the FBI, to the Special Agent in Charge (“SAC”) of
any field office, or the highest-ranking person within the field office.
Any of those officials can accept a protected disclosure. This
regulatory scheme is created to protect a disclosure because
allegations of criminal conduct, fraud, waste or abuse, or substantial
danger to public safety are serious.
The regulation is designed so that such disclosures can be made at
a level high enough within the organization that something will be
done about it, but the disclosure should stay within the department.
To that end, disclosures made to the press or to Congress, with one
exception, are not protected disclosures. For those who do not think
this is right, think about it in the following manner: the goal of
whistleblowing is for the agency to do something about the
allegations and get the government agency back in line to do what it
is they are supposed to do. A scheme that would allow an FBI
employee to go public and talk to the press about anything that he or
she knows or has some concern about poses very substantial risks to
national security and the confidentiality of law enforcement activities.
These risks are magnified by the fact that all FBI employees have
top-secret clearances. They are privy to some of the nation’s most
sensitive secrets. They are also privy to a lot of confidential
information. In Mike German’s introduction, the speaker noted that
he was an undercover agent. When he was working undercover, that
was an incredibly sensitive fact that could have gotten him or other
people killed. However, some employee could decide that he does
not like the fact that Mike German is undercover against X domestic
group and disclose it to the press as a whistleblower. Such an action
could put Mike in extreme danger. Danger to our employees is one
of several very practical reasons why whistleblowers should stay within
the organization and bring their concerns to a high level official, so
that appropriate action can be taken.
Even if an employee thinks, for instance, that their own SAC is
complicit in the criminality, there are enough different places for
them to go. They can go to an IG or to the Department of Justice.
There are enough options that no employee should feel that he or
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she is in the position of knowing horrible secrets of criminality and
have no place to turn. Although there may be issues with the
Department of State’s IG, no one has ever suggested that the
Department of Justice’s IG is anything but a vigorous advocate for
doing what is right. You have to make the disclosure to the right
person, but there is a fairly broad range of people to whom you can
make it.
Once an individual makes a disclosure, there is a very detailed
process that deals with claims of retaliation. Any employee who
believes that he or she has suffered adverse personnel action because
of a protected disclosure can complain or make a claim of retaliation
to either the Department’s OPR or the DOJ’s IG. The IG and OPR
work out between themselves who is going to investigate, and the
agencies have an obligation to conduct an investigation to determine
whether there are “reasonable grounds to believe that there has been
75
or will be a reprisal.” If the agency (IG or OPR) does not believe
there has been any reprisal, the complainant has to be informed and
given an opportunity to persuade the agency that he or she has been
retaliated against or is in danger of retaliation.
Interestingly, the procedural rules are tilted toward the
complainant, much like employment litigation, to make sure that
there is no reprisal. For example, if the IG or OPR concludes that
there is no reasonable ground to believe there was reprisal, the
government or the agency cannot use that finding in court unless the
complainant agrees. Therefore, the complainant can control how
that information gets out or if it ever gets out. On the other hand, if
the IG or OPR finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe
there was reprisal, it would report that together with their
recommendation for corrective action to OARM. It is then up to
OARM to determine whether in fact there has been reprisal. At this
point, OARM becomes the adjudicative branch. If OARM decides
that the protected disclosure was a “contributing factor” in the
personnel action that was at issue, corrective action will be ordered.
The standard used for determining whether it was a contributing
factor is incredibly low. Specifically, OARM can conclude that a
disclosure was a contributing factor if the person taking the
personnel action knew about the protected disclosure, or if the
personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a
reasonable person would conclude that it was a contributing factor.

75. 28 C.F.R. § 27.3(f) (2008).
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Therefore, if there is a disclosure, and an adverse personnel action
is taken shortly after, there is essentially a presumption that it was
reprisal. Again, this is incredibly protective of the employee. From
the FBI’s perspective, there is a presumption that if it is close in time,
it was a contributing factor. The burden shifts at that point to the
agency, and the FBI has to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence, which is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but is a
substantial amount of evidence, that we would have taken the same
personnel action regardless of the protected disclosure. At that point
you have a decision by OARM, and either side can appeal to the
Deputy Attorney General (“DAG”) if they disagree with the corrective
action—either from the perspective of the FBI, which is ordered to
do something that they disagree with, or from the employee’s
perspective, if he or she thinks the corrective action is inadequate or
the finding against the retaliation claim is in error.
That is the basic scheme. But there is one other pertinent statute
relevant to intelligence community employees. FBI employees also
get the benefit of the Intelligence Community Whistleblowers
76
Protection Act of 1998. Under that Act, an employee can bring an
issue of “urgent concern” to the IG. A matter of “urgent concern” is
“[a] serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive
Order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or
operations of an intelligence activity involving classified information,
but does not include differences of opinions concerning public
77
Interestingly, it also does not include false
policy matters.”
statements to Congress, which seems a little odd.
If the IG finds the allegation to be credible, the IG is obligated to
tell the Director, who is, in turn, required to tell Congress. If the IG
finds the allegation is not credible, then the employee can go directly
to a member of Congress who is a House or Senate Intelligence
Committee member. If the employee chooses to contact a member
of Congress, he or she must notify the Director of the FBI and follow
the directions given relative to the classified information being
disclosed. The Director can impose certain security rules on the
employee before he or she can go to Congress, but nonetheless the
employee can get to Congress.
The statutory scheme works pretty well. The FBI does not receive a
lot of claims of whistleblower reprisal. As General Counsel, there are
more claims that employees have been retaliated against for
76. 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H (Supp. II 2002).
77. Id. § 8H(h)(1).
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exercising their rights under the EEOC claim system than because
they are whistleblowers. One concern about this system is that it can
be abused. For instance, OARM will still view an allegation by an
employee as a protected disclosure if the employee goes first to a
member of Congress and then the Congress brings it to our
attention, instead of going to one of the employees or officials as
provided in the statute or regulation. From our perspective, that
thwarts the statutory scheme because it prohibits us from taking
initial corrective action. Employees may presume that “management
already knows this,” but some FBI managers manage an organization
of 40,000 employees all over the world. Lots of things occur in the
FBI that I do not know as the General Counsel and certainly the
Director does not know. It is useful for us to learn these things from
the employee first.
Another question that often arises regarding whistleblowers is
whether they are good or bad. The answer is, sometimes they are
good, and sometimes they are bad. Sometimes they are just cranky
employees that have decided that they know better than everybody
else how something should be done and what should be done. When
such an employee makes national security information public
because they disagree with the policy decisions, then the
whistleblower is not a net benefit to the Bureau and is not a net
benefit to you, the American people. There is the DOJ, a Presidential
appointee in charge of the FBI, and lots of extremely dedicated
employees who are trying to do the right thing, and it is not
beneficial to set up a scheme where that whole organization of very
good, honorable people are held hostage to some nutty whistleblower
who decides to go public with information that should never be made
available to the public in the first place.
VII. CONGRESSIONAL PANEL: SETTING A POSITIVE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA
FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Congressman Robert C. “Bobby” Scott∗
Thank you, Caroline for your very kind introduction. When she
said she was going to introduce me, I was a little bit nervous. We give
a lot of speeches and half the people that introduce us do not know
us. (Laughter) They are confined to the script that we give them, so
we can be comforted that we are going to get a nice introduction.

∗

Congressman, Third Congressional District of Virginia
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When someone knows you well, they can tell all the truth. Thank
you, Caroline for just telling the good stuff.
Thank you to the ACLU for having this forum on the Constitution
and First Amendment protections because there are a lot of
controversies going on in Congress as we speak. As we talk about
protecting the Constitution, and about all that I have done to protect
the Constitution, I am reminded of the old man that ended up at the
Pearly Gates. He, at a very young age, had survived the Johnstown
Flood, and he always liked to tell the story about that flood. As he got
older and older, it occurred to him that there were fewer and fewer
and fewer people around who could actually validate the facts. And
so he took advantage of that, and that flood (Laughter) grew, and
grew, and grew, and he showed up at the Pearly Gates and he said,
Saint Peter, I want to tell the story about the flood. And Saint Peter
said, yeah, yeah, yeah, we have been listening to this, and you have
been boring everybody, but I will tell you what: you can tell it once,
and that’s it. And the old man said, “Okay, okay.” And so Saint Peter
gathered everybody together to listen to this story and gave the old
man a nice introduction, and then said, now, before you tell the story
about the flood, remember that Noah is in the audience. (Laughter)
So, Caroline, thank you for all you have done for protecting the
Constitution. Thank you Nadine Strossen and Ron Smolla, who is
from my part of Virginia. All the experts and people who have really
been defending the Constitution are here in the audience, and I am
supposed to give a speech about protecting the Constitution.
But I can talk about protecting the Constitution from a
congressional perspective, because during the last few years, we have
had a frontal assault on the Constitution, particularly with things like
78
the Patriot Act (“Act”). The 9/11 attack gave some individuals an
opportunity they have not had for a long time because now they
could effectively use fear to get a lot of legislation passed. The reason
why the Patriot Act passed so quickly and why people could put it
together so quickly was that it did not take any original thinking. The
drafters just reached up on the shelf, pulled out everything they had
not been able to get passed for years, stapled it all together, and then
put “Patriotism” as the title. And all of the sudden, using fear, they
were able to get this legislation passed.
One of the most egregious parts of the Patriot Act, of course, is its
79
As Martin Neimöller once said:
authorization of wiretapping.
78. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in
scattered title numbers and sections of the U.S.C.).
79. See id. tit. II (Enhanced Surveillance Procedures).
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“When they came after the communists, I did not complain because I
was not a communist; when they came after the trade unionists, I did
not complain because I did not belong to a union; when they came
after the Jews, I did not complain because I was not Jewish; and when
they came after me, there was nobody left to complain.” If you see
rights eroding, and fail to complain, and do not try to stop it, it will
just get worse.
Wiretapping has gotten worse, to the point where the most recent
version has virtually no oversight. Both the FBI director and the
director of National Intelligence can authorize the gathering of
foreign intelligence even when it involves people in the United
States. If a call is being made into the United States, they can
authorize a wiretap.
There are a lot of little parts of the wiretapping provisions that are
troublesome. The Act authorizes wiretapping of conversations
involving foreign intelligence information, without any oversight, if
foreign intelligence officials think you are talking about terrorism or
so-called “foreign intelligence.”
“Foreign intelligence” can be
anything that can help in foreign diplomacy, like a trade deal, or
anything else. In fact, anything related to diplomacy constitutes
“foreign intelligence”—no crime needs to be alleged and the
information will still constitute foreign intelligence as long as it will
help in diplomacy.
Furthermore, wiretapping can be authorized if foreign intelligence
information is a “significant purpose” of the surveillance. Obtaining
foreign intelligence information does not have to be the primary
purpose of the surveillance, but merely a significant purpose. This,
of course, raises a question. If obtaining foreign intelligence
information is not the primary purpose, then what is the primary
purpose for the wiretap?
A few years ago, I asked then Attorney General Gonzales what
could be a legitimate primary purpose of surveillance if it is not
gathering foreign intelligence? He said that running a criminal
investigation could be a primary purpose, which means that it would
be possible to run the criminal investigation without needing to go
through the aggravation of having to show probable cause before
starting to wiretap people.
The lack of oversight in wiretapping is also a little troublesome in
light of the fact that this Administration has not credibly responded
to the allegation that it abused the criminal justice process by firing
United States Attorneys who were not indicting Democrats in time to
effect elections. Some U.S. Attorneys would not bring those
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indictments, so they were fired.
U.S. Attorneys who were
investigating Republicans were also fired. We are now finding out
that some U.S. Attorneys, who filed what seemed to be frivolous
charges against Democrats in time to affect elections, kept their jobs.
These are the allegations—that the Administration used the
criminal justice process for partisan political purposes. Attorney
General Gonzales gave a response; however, other Justice
Department officials said that he was not telling the truth. One
official quit, another one pleaded the Fifth, and White House officials
are not showing up in response to subpoenas. Are the allegations
true? We do not know, but we do know that the allegations have not
been credibly responded to, and so when we consider the Patriot Act,
we must consider the appropriateness of giving this Administration
new power to wiretap, especially when the primary purpose of the
wiretap is not known.
The Act also has some interesting changes in definitions. It says
that a warrant is not needed in either of the following scenarios: if
the wiretap is directed at people both of whom are overseas; or if the
call is “concerning” someone “believed to be overseas.” That is a
disconcerting idea, because if you and I are talking about Tony Blair,
he is “believed to be overseas.” Does that mean that Administration
officials can tap into our conversation? I do not know, but there is
enough ambiguity since the words in the next section say
notwithstanding any other law they can authorize the wiretaps.
Obviously, once the wiretap is authorized, roving surveillance goes
into effect, whereby the Administration can tap any phone that the
target of the investigation is using. And there is, in fact, no oversight.
The only oversight is that the Administration has to file its plan with
the court. The court has to accept the wiretap plan unless the court
finds that it is clearly illegal.
The court does not decide whether or not the wiretap is legal. If
the wiretap is not clearly illegal, the court must approve the plan.
Even if the court finds that the wiretap is clearly illegal, the
Administration can appeal. Meanwhile, the Administration can
continue implementing its plan during the pendency of the appeal,
which can go all the way to the Supreme Court. During that time,
although the court has found that the wiretap is clearly illegal, the
Administration can still continue to implement its plan anyway. That
is what we have come to. Fortunately, most of that is in the part of
the bill that expires in six months. But the fact that we have passed it
at all should be extremely disturbing to a lot of people.
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You get the sense that the Administration is really offended when
you suggest that there need to be checks and balances. The
Administration acts as if you are questioning its integrity when you say
that there ought to be checks and balances. No, it is just checks and
balances. When the Administration does something, it should just
tell the court; the court will go along with it, but humor me and tell
the court. And if the Administration is in a hurry, go ahead and do
what needs to be done; just tell the court later, by utilizing provisions
for emergency wiretaps.
The Administration keeps saying that we need to, in balancing
security and liberties, focus on security. However, this is not a
question about security and liberty because there is nothing they can
do with this law, i.e., no oversight wiretapping, that they could not do
before if they just stopped by the court and told the court what they
were doing. Or, if the Administration is in a hurry, it can do what it
needs to do and then tell the court on the way back. Thus, the
Administration can do anything that would be legal without
oversight, with a warrant, if they just go through the little process of
obtaining a warrant. In short, you are not balancing your rights and
your liberties, you are just having fundamental checks and balances.
The Administration wants to try people using military tribunals;
unfortunately, we did not complain about that—it slid through.
Military tribunals are not court-martials; a court-martial is a regular
trial process. In a military tribunal, there is no right to a public trial.
There is only a vague right to an attorney. There is no right against
self-incrimination. There is no presumption of innocence. There is
no need for proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
I saw one Senator ask then Attorney General Ashcroft about this:
are you requiring guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or some guilt
level beyond just preponderance of the evidence—something like
compelling, clear and convincing—and they kept going back and
forth. It occurred to me that the Attorney General was not even
conceding a preponderance of the evidence standard. It was almost
as if a less than clearly erroneous standard could be a basis for guilt.
But we did not complain about the standard of proof and the next
thing we ended up with was the concept of “enemy combatant,” for
whom the Department of Justice did not even bother to have a trial.
The Department of Justice simply designates someone as an enemy
combatant and locks them up, indefinitely. No charges, no trial,
nothing. I asked then Attorney General Ashcroft at a hearing: What
happens if you have designated someone as an enemy combatant and
they are locked up, but they are actually factually innocent of the
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allegations? Suppose the enemy combatant’s story is as follows: I saw
your informant point in my direction, but he was pointing at the
person behind me; he was not pointing at me. Tell me what I am
accused of, and I can explain that it was not me. I asked the Attorney
General when, in this process of designation and then lockup, does
the individual have an opportunity to make his or her case? And the
answer was, “At the end of the conflict.” At the end of the war on
terrorism, you can say that you were locked up without cause. That is
what you end up with when you do not take a stand. We did not take
a stand regarding military tribunals, and now we have people locked
up as enemy combatants.
If you do not take a stand against unreasonable searches and
seizures and unreasonable criminal trials, the Administration is not
going to stop at those parts of the Constitution; instead, it will move
on to the other parts of the Constitution, like the First Amendment—
religious liberties. The idea that decisions need to be based on
principle is really nowhere to be found. Some will take little
innocuous cases and create very difficult analytical problems.
Take the question of whether or not “under God” can legally be
part of the Pledge of Allegiance required to be recited in elementary
80
school. I happen to agree with the dissent in the Ninth Circuit,
which said that the reference to God in the Pledge is so innocuous
that nobody pays any attention to it and instead it is constitutionally
meaningless. Unfortunately, due to the fact that there have been
81
several congressional resolutions, and people have held rallies about
the issue, the argument that the phrase is innocuous is difficult to
sustain.
Moreover, what standard should be used to evaluate whether the
phrase is constitutional? If you are going to determine that
something is not innocuous, what standard will you use to evaluate it?
Should we use the coercion standard? School children have to go to
school and are coerced into reciting the Pledge, which is now
considered a meaningful religious message. So on that basis, the
policy of reciting the Pledge would have to fail. What about
considering whether there is an establishment of one view of religion,
i.e., monotheism, because the Pledge includes “under God,” not
“gods”? That is an establishment, so if we look at the Pledge from an
80. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir.) (Fernandez, J.,
dissenting), amended by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
81. See, e.g., S. Res. 292, 107th Cong. (2002) (expressing support for the Pledge
of Allegiance); H.R. Res. 459, 107th Cong. (2002) (expressing the House of
Representatives’ opinion that Newdow was erroneously decided).
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establishment analysis, it must fail. How about the Lemon Test? Is
there any secular purpose? The Pledge used to be recited without
the phrase “under God” in it. The congressional resolution that put
83
“under God” into the Pledge was a separate resolution that had no
other purpose other than the insertion of the phrase “under God,”
into the Pledge. Inserting such a phrase has no secular purpose. So
once again, the Pledge fails. If you are trying to have any principled
resolution of this issue, once you give up the possibility that the
phrase is innocuous, it has to fail.
Sometimes we avoid any analysis at all by using something called
“Court-Stripping.” In other words, do not let the courts decide
certain issues. Congress is doing that on the issue of gay marriage by
passing legislation stripping federal courts from having jurisdiction to
hear cases involving the Defense of Marriage Act. This is especially
interesting for people in Virginia because it was those so-called
“liberal, lifetime-appointed, activist federal judges” who declared
Virginia’s laws prohibiting mixed race marriage unconstitutional
even though the marriage laws were the properly enacted law in
Virginia reflecting the will of the people. I was happy to see those socalled “liberal, lifetime-appointed, activist federal judges” take that
position. And if this “Court-Stripping” idea had been in effect back
then, I am not sure we could have ever repealed that law (I was a
member of the General Assembly of Virginia for fifteen years).
Thankfully, those “liberal, lifetime-appointed, activist federal judges”
did it for us.
Another issue is the posting of the Ten Commandments. Who
wants to decide which version, the Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish
version, of the Ten Commandments gets posted? If you can post the
Ten Commandments, what else can you post? Those are questions
that are best left to the traditional view of the Establishment Clause—
you cannot post any of them.
84
Another issue is the proposed “Flag Burning Amendment.”
There is no analysis in any of the flag cases that makes a prohibition
of flag burning legitimate under any analysis of the First
82. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (ruling that in order to
comport with the Establishment Clause a statute must meet three criteria: “First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . [and third,] the statute
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”) (citation
omitted).
83. H.R.J. Res. 243, 83d Cong., 68 Stat. 294 (1954).
84. The most recent resolution proposing to amend the Constitution to prohibit
the physical desecration of the U.S. flag, S.J. Res. 12, 109th Cong. (2006), did not
pass.

2008]

LEFT OUT IN THE COLD?

1255

85

Laws can proscribe time, place, and manner of
Amendment.
speech, but not content. In actuality, this bill is called the Flag
Desecration Amendment, not the Flag Burning Amendment, because
its supporters do not want it to reach the American Legion. The only
time I have seen a flag actually burned was by the American Legion
during a flag retirement ceremony. Any Boy Scout will tell you that
you dispose of a worn-out flag by holding a respectful ceremony and
then burning the flag. That is not “desecration,” that is respect.
Desecration is when you have some war protestors say something that
offends the local sheriff when they are burning the flag. They say it is
action, not speech. No. Burning the flag while saying something
nice is okay. But if you burn the flag and insult the sheriff, they want
to lock you up. Anybody who has any idea what flag burning and the
First Amendment is all about knows that you cannot prohibit
desecration under any principled analysis of the First Amendment.
In other religious cases, there is a sense that if you are in the
majority, you can get your way. If you are a member of the majority
religion, there are privileges that some want to enjoy that members of
other religions cannot. The faith-based initiative is right in the
86
If you boil the faith-based initiative down to its
middle of that.
essentials, all it does is allow some sponsors of federally funded
programs to discriminate with federal money. It does not allow faithbased groups to sponsor federally funded programs. They can do
that already. Five percent of the Head Start programs are already
sponsored by faith-based organizations. They sponsor them just like
everybody else. You have to use the money for the purpose for which
it was appropriated, and you have to abide by civil rights laws.
Catholic charities and other groups have been getting billions of
dollars of federal money for years, and using the money for the
purpose for which it was appropriated. They cannot proselytize or
use it for a religious program, and they have to comply with civil
rights laws. Some religious organizations want to use their Title VII
87
exemption, under which they can discriminate in hiring with their
own congregation’s funding, and carry over that exemption to the
federal money that they receive from the faith-based initiative for
government-funded programs. For example, the Head Start program
would like to say to an applicant: while you would have been a great
85. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968).
86. See Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 31, 2001) (establishing
the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000).
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Head Start teacher and you are the best applicant that we have, we do
not hire people of your religion. Moreover, discrimination based on
religion effectively leads to discrimination based on race. For
example, a Head Start program employer might say to an applicant:
just by looking at you, I can tell we do not have people who look like
you that belong to our church. So you cannot get a job here. Where
I come from, there are a lot—I do not know if it is most—but there
are a lot of religious organizations that are, to the nearest percentage,
one hundred percent black or one hundred percent white. If you are
picking people just from your church, that has racial overtones.
Under these circumstances, if you are discriminating based on
religion, then you are also discriminating based on race.
I have asked some of my civil rights lawyer friends if they have ever
heard of a racial discrimination case made against a church. None of
these civil rights lawyers had heard of even one such case. Thus
people in federally funded programs could be discriminating based
on religion, race, and other grounds, all under the guise of religion.
There is also another interesting aspect of this issue. If you allow
someone to discriminate in a federally funded program based on
race and religion, where is your moral authority to tell a devoutly
religious businessman what he can do with his own money? In the
1960s, we convinced the requisite portion of the United States that
employment discrimination based on race or religion was so
reprehensible that we made it illegal. If we now allow such
discrimination to occur in a federally funded program, we lose the
moral authority to have any civil rights laws to tell someone what they
have to do with their own money.
But some believe that since we are in the majority, we can pass the
law that will allow that kind of discrimination because, the fact of the
matter is, our side will be doing the discriminating. As a result, no
harm will be done. We are not going to be discriminated against. In
fact, when they talk about civil rights in this respect, they talk about
the right of the person discriminating. It used to be that the victim of
discrimination was the one that had the power of the federal
government on their side. Now, the power of the federal government
protects someone’s right to discriminate.
One of the problems we have had in this debate is that it is so
extreme that nobody believes that the debate is actually going on. I
have asked people the following question: if someone offered an
amendment that allowed some Head Start programs to tell some
people that the programs do not hire people of their religion, what
chance do you think that amendment would have to pass? And their
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response, generally, is that the provision would be unconstitutional
and that the amendment would have no chance of passing. And then
I have to explain to them that these provisions have been passing the
House for the last six or seven years; actually, we have been voting on
this issue for almost ten years, and that a few months ago was the first
time we actually won and prevented this type of provision from
passing. Every other time we lost the vote; the Republican majority
has voted almost unanimously to allow that kind of discrimination.
People just do not believe that this kind of discussion is going on.
Indeed, it is still alive and well, and in some programs, they have
actually gotten it through. But there is a sense that if you are in the
majority you can fix the results.
When you talk about a “fair” trial, the idea is that you cannot fix
the result in a trial. The most high profile example of that was the
Terri Schiavo case where the court system had consistently ruled on
behalf of the next of kin, the husband. The majority in Congress was
offended by that decision and wanted to change the result
88
legislatively. We passed a bill to allow standing for the parents in
that case simply because the majority agreed with the parents. In the
next case, however, we might agree with the husband, not the other
relatives, and we would not want them in court. So, we passed
legislation to fix the result in that case only. The bill actually passed
the House by an overwhelming margin. I think the public was pretty
much offended that we would intervene in that kind of case. And
they were certainly offended by the idea that we tried to fix the result
after it had been properly considered by the courts and there had
been a fair resolution of the case, whether you agreed with the result
or not.
But it was not the only trial whose result we wrongly tried to fix.
The NAACP and other groups have been suing gun manufacturers
based on the idea that somebody who gets shot in the street in New
York should be able to sue the gun manufacturer for the way that the
89
gun manufacturer manufactured and distributed the firearms. Well,
that is a stretch. These plaintiffs had not won any cases, but just to
make sure, the gun manufacturers’ lobbyist came to Congress seeking
immunity for those organizations. In other words, Congress decided
that we would try the case in the legislative branch instead of letting
the case be tried in the judicial branch, where the parties would be
relegated to an impartial judge and jury and the same law applies to
88. Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3,
119 Stat. 15 (2005).
89. E.g., NAACP v. Accusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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everybody else. Instead, we allowed one party to go to the legislative
branch, where it could try to influence the result by contributing
money to the triers, and where the result would be based on
90
popularity, not the Rule of Law. They passed the bill and essentially
tried the case. In effect, Congress gave immunity to the gun
manufacturers in the legislative branch rather than letting the
judicial branch take care of it.
The fast food industry did the same thing. There was the
91
“McDonalds makes you fat” legislation, where people sued
McDonalds. The plaintiffs had not gotten anywhere, but just to make
sure, the House passed a bill to immunize the food industry. Again,
no rule of law supported this, but contributions and popularity
obviously effected the result. They also, kind of under the radar
screen, stuck a lot of products liability and other provisions in there.
But we passed that bill in the House.
92
One case in Northern Virginia that people remember—although
I am not sure that they remember how it actually ended up—was the
child custody case involving two doctors, Dr. Morgan and Dr.
Foretich. The mother had accused the husband of molesting the
child, but visitation was ordered anyway. She took the child, ended
up in jail for the year, and the child ended up in Australia
somewhere. We entered final judgment to fix the result in that case
in a Transportation Appropriations Conference Committee
93
report —just stuck it in a conference committee report. When the
bill came back for an up or down vote, Members had to decide
whether they were in favor of federal transportation funding or not,
with this little phrase in there that fixed the result of that case. When
the bill passed, the individuals came back from Australia to the
United States. This was not an example of the Rule of Law; Congress
wanted their side to win, so they fixed the result.
We have another situation in which the majority wants to enforce,
through the Executive Branch, the disclosure of some testimony.
They want to make reporters testify in violation of hundreds of years
94
of tradition. As a result, we are considering a Reporter Shield Law
that will be discussed later this afternoon.

90. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7901 (Supp. V
2005).
91. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 554, 109th Cong.
(2005).
92. Morgan v. Foretich, 521 A.2d 248 (D.C. 1987).
93. H.R. REP. NO. 104-785, at 14 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
94. Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007).
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Attorney-client privilege:
Is there a right to attorney-client
privilege in criminal cases or are individuals and corporations being
coerced into waiving that privilege? Congress is going to have to
consider attorney-client privilege laws to make sure that individuals
and corporations are not coerced into giving up their right to
attorney-client privilege.
As a result, we wonder where the Rule of Law is. We wonder if
some sponsors of federal programs want to use federal money for
religious purposes. Maybe Congress could just vote and pass that, but
where is the Rule of Law? They want to win a lawsuit; they just have
the case decided by the legislative branch. If they want to listen to
conversations of people without probable cause of any crimes, they
just get to listen in—there is no respect for the Rule of Law.
If you want to protect the Constitution, then you need a strong
ACLU. That is why I am happy to be here this morning. Because if it
was not for the ACLU—in spite of all the defeats we have had—it
would have been a lot worse. (Laughter) Caroline, Nadine, and
others, thank you for your hard work, and keep up the good work.
CAROLINE FREDRICKSON: Thank you so much, Congressman Scott. I
have to say, we were starting to feel a little depressed with the litany of lawsuits
but you picked me up there at the end; I appreciate that. I had an interesting
experience earlier this week on behalf of Nadine who was unable to speak to a
group of generals. I spoke to them about a couple of the issues that you
mentioned here, particularly about surveillance and about the issue of military
commissions and taking away habeas corpus rights from the detainees at
Guantanamo. I mentioned the role of checks and balances and how important
it was, and they sort of looked at me, a little blankly, and then I said, just
remember, we could be talking about President Hillary Clinton. Then they all
started nodding—all right, checks and balances. (Laughter)
In light of what you mentioned about checks and balances and, in
particular, the way that this Administration has used the State Secrets
Privilege and classified documents to such an extent, how does Congress
perform its role as a check on the Executive Branch in a world where the
Executive Branch denies Congress access to information, and where the courts
are cut out as well?
CONGRESSMAN SCOTT:
The right of Congress to get
information under those circumstances is partly legal, but mostly
political because as we try to get information and enforce subpoenas,
public opinion really comes into play and politicians get punished for
stepping overboard. When the Administration claims executive
privilege, it gets away with it unless it is clearly overstepping, because
if we try to enforce a subpoena, the judicial branch must order the
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enforcement of the subpoena. But the public is actively involved
during that process.
When they say something is classified, it is a curious process. I
asked the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, if
there was some process by which they classify and declassify—so that
you know when something is classified, and if it is no longer
classified, you know when it was declassified—because we frequently
find at congressional hearings that individuals would say, “Oh, no
that is classified.” Then, the next day, we would watch CNN and they
would be discussing the issue that we had asked about. Well, when
was it declassified? When Vice President Cheney or the head of the
National Intelligence decided to blurt it out—the minute they blurt it
out—is it no longer classified or is there some process, is there some
federal record when things are declassified? We do not know.
Then there is the issue of trying to get information from
uncooperative executive branch officials. We went through this in
the U.S. Attorney situation, where people tried to rephrase the
questions we were asking to make the issue about whether the
President has the authority to use politics in selecting and firing U.S.
Attorneys. Of course he does; that is an easy question. But that was
not the issue. The issue was: does he have the right to obstruct
justice by firing and threatening to fire people unless they file
frivolous charges to get a partisan political result? I think that is the
question that we need to ask, and we have not gotten an answer to
that question. One official quit and another accused Attorney
General Gonzales of not telling the truth; one admitted under oath
that she had “crossed the line,” and some will not show for
subpoenas. It has been very difficult to get any information.
Some of the Republican-appointed U.S. Attorneys alleged that they
were fired because they did not follow the partisan-political agenda.
Now these are not left-wing Democrats, these are Republican
appointees saying this. And we have not been able to get information
even though we subpoenaed Administration officials; they just
decided not to show up. I hope we are going to make it clear that the
alleged acts constitute obstruction of justice, so I do not think we are
going to just drop it. I think we are going to continue to try to get
information, but we have been trying to get the most mundane
information and it has clearly taken a long time.
What you suggested is a challenging problem. We are working with
it—the U.S. Attorneys question and the wiretap question. We are not
getting many answers. Part of the problem is this Administration has
had essentially no oversight. Congress has not been a check and
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balance, rather Congress has been more of a cheerleader for the
Administration. For several years, whatever the Administration
wanted to do, Congress did not question it; instead, they tried to sell
it. Now, the Administration actually has to answer questions, and it is
a new experience.
CAROLINE FREDRICKSON: That is certainly different from my
experience in the Clinton Administration. Well, thank you very much for your
answer. Congressman, you mentioned a couple of issues earlier with the
Reporter Shield Legislation. That is obviously a very critical factor, as well as
whistleblower protection, to ensure that congressional oversight is
complemented by the access that the press has to information and protections
for the press, as well as opportunities for whistleblowers to come forward.
CONGRESSMAN SCOTT: The problem with the Reporter Shield
Law is that you never needed one on a federal level because people
were reasonable. You just did not press so hard to get a reporter to
testify. Now, they are just throwing reporters in jail. There has always
been a balance between the reporters’ right to get information, and
the Executive Branch and judicial branch right to get the
information. There has always been a tension, and we have always
been able to work it out because everybody was reasonable, so you did
not have this problem. Now, we have this problem.
There also was no need for an attorney-client privilege statute
because people were always reasonable. Now, we need to consider
95
this kind of legislation. There was never any need for direction
about whether or not the Executive Branch could invade a
congressional office the way they did where they just went in and took
everything. They do not just go in and grab a discrete piece of
evidence, like drugs in the bottom-left drawer, get the drugs, and
come out. Now they come out with all the computers, all of the
legislative work, everything. This never happened in centuries, and
then it happened. If a legislative agency went over to the White
House and went into Karl Rove’s office and started to leave with his
computer so that Nancy Pelosi’s staff could look at his computer files,
people would understand what the problem is. We need to respect
each other. They could have worked together to get the necessary
information. The Executive Branch officials could have worked with
the Capitol Police to figure out how to get into the office to get the
necessary information. Instead they just sent the Executive Branch
officials there with a subpoena; and while I do not think there is any
95. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 3013, 110th Cong.
(2007).
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question that they had that right, there is a reason why it had never
happened before. When you are dealing with an administration that
is right on the edge, pushing the envelope time and time again, and
when you have never had to deal with these types of questions that we
are now having to deal with, it makes things difficult. We will keep
doing the best we can. I think the public sentiment will turn and
make life very difficult for the Administration. And there are things
you can do with a majority of Congress; Congress can start to override
vetoes. And there are other things that you can do if you have
enough public support behind you.
B. Congressman Mike Pence∗
Thank you all. I had to check my schedule twice this morning to
see if I was given the right schedule, and I was handed the right
schedule. I am at the ACLU conference. Thank you very much.
Honestly on this issue, there is very little daylight between the historic
work of this great national champion of civil liberties and the First
Amendment and this Indiana Congressman. Thank you for the
opportunity to be here.
I am a conservative Republican. I like to tell people I am a
conservative, but I am not in a bad mood about it. (Laughter)
Hopefully some of the work that I, and my counterpart and mentor,
Senator Richard Lugar from Indiana, have done in the last three
years to attempt to put a stitch in what I believe is a tear in the First
Amendment freedom of the press, provides some evidence of the
commonality of these ideas among Americans of diverse views,
politically and ideologically. I think all of us, as Americans, cherish
the blood-bought liberties that are found and enshrined in the Bill of
Rights.
I want to speak to you about those liberties today. It is particularly
momentous to be able to come before you today because the
legislation that we introduced three years ago, the Free Flow of
96
Information Act, colloquially referred to as the “Federal Media
Shield Bill,” was marked up this summer and reported for the first
time ever out of the House Judiciary Committee. As I speak to you
today, the Senate Judiciary Committee is marking up and considering
the Free Flow of Information Act in the United States Senate.
Indeed, we may well have news before dinner tonight that the Free
Flow of Information Act and this Federal Media Shield Bill has
∗ Congressman, Sixth Congressional District of Indiana.
96. H.R. Res. 581, 109th Cong. (2005).
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arrived at a place that heretofore was unattainable despite one
hundred legislative efforts since the early 1970s.
Let me speak to you about the legislation, and then I would like to
take questions. I used to do a call-in radio show. My wife listened to
it occasionally (Laughter)—and just occasionally—and I would always
ask her, “Well, how do you think the show went?” And she would say,
“Well, it got really good after you started taking calls,” (Laughter)
which told me that I am probably better at dialogue than
monologues. So before I have to cut away here, I would love to get
into a dialogue with you all about how we have been building this
legislation and about some of the challenges that we have faced.
Colonel Robert R. McCormick, the grandson of the founder of the
Chicago Tribune, wrote words that are now chiseled into the wall of the
lobby of that newspaper’s building. I think these words are an
appropriate starting point in this discussion. He wrote, “The
newspaper is an institution developed by modern civilization to
present the news of the day . . . and to furnish that check upon
government which no constitution has ever been able to provide.”
Occasionally reporters have approached me over the last three
years, and said, “Now, I saw you doing a Federal Media Shield Bill.”
And I say, “Right.” They say, “Do you think the media is kind of
liberal or . . . .” And I say, “Oh, yeah, the national media is terribly
liberal in my view; it is very biased.” And they say, “Well, you know,
this kind of helps reporters do . . . .” They are kind of checking my
IQ; generally, in my experience, this is always a good thing to do with
Republicans. (Laughter) But then they look to the left, look to the
right, and they kind of say, “Hey, thanks.” (Laughter) And I tell
them, number one, as an American, you are welcome. But number
two, let me assure you, this legislation is not about protecting
reporters; it is about protecting the public’s right to know. Then I
generally go on to explain that as a conservative who believes in
limited government, I think that a free and independent press is the
only check on government power in real time.
We often speak about elections and we often speak about the
accountability of the democratic process. But even a casual observer
of American government understands that elections come and go in
different bi-annual intervals. The day-in and day-out, antiseptic of
free and independent press is truly the only limit on government
power upon which we can rely. I think our founders enshrined in the
First Amendment those words, “Congress shall make no law . . .
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abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,” for precisely that
reason. The Constitution enshrined, I believe, a Republic which is
defined by its limited nature and the limited scope of its powers. Our
founders certainly did not include protections of the press in the First
Amendment because they got good press. All you have to do is
Google me once to find out that I occasionally put my foot in my
mouth and pay for it in the press. But again, as someone who
believes in limited government, it is my conviction that a free and
independent press is the only check on government power in real
time, and conservatives and liberals ought to be able to understand
and embrace this.
Thomas Jefferson warned, “[O]ur liberty . . . cannot be guarded
but by the freedom of the press, nor that be limited without danger
98
of losing it.” During the last three years, we have been working on a
bipartisan basis. Senator Lugar, Senator Dodd, Chairman Leahy,
former Chairman Specter, and I are working with Congressman Rick
Boucher, along with the original co-sponsor, Chairman Conyers of
the Judiciary Committee, and the distinguished member, Republican
Member Howard Coble. We have come together on a bipartisan
basis to advance a very simple principle. That principle is to take
those words of the First Amendment to heart, and to take an
important step toward repairing what I think is a tear in the First
Amendment freedom of the press.
Not long ago, reporters’ assurance of confidentiality was
unquestionable. That assurance led to sources providing information
to reporters who then brought forward news of extraordinary
consequences in the life of the nation like Watergate, where
government corruption and misdeeds were brought to light by the
dogged persistence of a free and independent press. However, the
press cannot, this day, make the same assurance of confidentiality to
sources. I say with a heavy heart, we face a real danger in America
today that there may never be another Deep Throat.
In recent years, reporters, like Judith Miller, have been jailed.
James Taricani was placed on house arrest, and both Mark FainaruWada and Lance Williams were threatened with jail terms.
Protections provided by the Free Flow of Information Act are
necessary so members of the media can bring forward information to
the American public without fear of retribution or prosecution, and
so sources will continue to come forward. Compelling reporters to
97. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
98. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (Jan. 25, 1786), in 5 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 73 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Knickerbocker Press 1904).
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testify, and in particular, compelling them to reveal their confidential
sources, is unquestionably a detriment to the public interest.
Without the promise of confidentiality, many important conduits of
information about our government will be shut down.
The
dissemination of information by the media to the public on matters
ranging from the operation of government, to events in our local
communities, is invaluable to the operation of a democracy. Not only
in cases involving corruption, but also in cases involving the
expenditure of billions of dollars by future generations of Americans;
a free and independent press is an essential element in that cause.
Without the free flow of information from sources to reporters, I
submit that the public will be ill-equipped to make informed choices
as an informed electorate. This is not to say the press is without fail
or always gets the story right. One of my favorite quotes from James
Madison is where he wrote, “To the press alone, checkered [sic] as it
is with abuses, the world is indebted for all the triumphs which have
been gained by reason and humanity, over error and
99
oppression . . . .”
As a conservative, I believe the concentration of power should be
subject to great scrutiny. Integrity in government is not a Democratic
or Republican issue. And corruption, sadly, cannot be laid at the feet
of any one particular political party. When scandal hits either party,
or any branch of government, or any institution of our society, it
wounds our nation. The longer I serve in Congress, the more firmly I
believe in the wisdom of our Founders, especially as it pertains to the
First Amendment freedom of the press. It is imperative that we
preserve the transparency and integrity of the American government,
and the only way to do that is by ensuring a free and independent
press.
It is important to note the legislation that will be considered in the
Senate today, that we have introduced to move in the House Judiciary
Committee, is not a radical step. Thirty-two states and the District of
Columbia have various statutes that protect reporters from being
compelled to testify or disclose sources of information in court.
Seventeen states have protections for reporters as a result of judicial
decisions. The Free Flow of Information Act would simply set
national standards similar to those that represent the law of most
99. James Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in THE VIRGINIA AND
KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1788 AND ‘99: WITH JEFFERSON’S ORIGINAL DRAUGHT
THEREOF; ALSO, MADISON’S REPORT, CALHOUN’S ADDRESS, RESOLUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL
STATES IN RELATION TO STATE RIGHTS; WITH OTHER DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE
JEFFERSONIAN DOCTRINES OF ‘98, at 36 (Jonathan Elliot, ed., Washington 1832).
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states. I would submit to you that not only has the legislation been a
productive compromise, as all legislation is, it has also been carefully
crafted after reviewing the internal Department of Justice guidelines
and state shield laws as templates.
The legislation puts forth, in very specific terms, a qualified
privilege, which I believe strikes an appropriate balance between the
public’s need for information and the fair administration of justice.
In most instances under our legislation, a reporter will be able to use
the shield provided in the bill to refrain from testifying, providing
documents, or revealing a confidential source. However, I want to be
clear. The privilege is not absolute or unlimited. Different issues are
raised in state jurisdictions, and one has to acknowledge that at the
national level, there are different issues as well. The part of our
government that is charged with providing for the common defense
has different pressures and different challenges than state or local
governments ever can or will have. On that basis, testimony of
documents can be forced only if all reasonable alternative sources
have been exhausted, and the testimony or document sources are
critical to a criminal prosecution or civil case, and a judge determines
that the public interest in compelling disclosure outweighs the public
interest in gathering or disseminating news or information. The
addition of this balancing test ensures that a full and fair
consideration will be given to both sides in the determination of
whether a reporter must testify or turn over documents. Specifically,
in a situation where a reporter is being asked to reveal the identity of
a confidential source, the bill provides several exceptions whereby the
reporter can be compelled to reveal the source.
Before going into that issue, I have never spoken to Bob Woodward
about this, and I suspect many of you in the room have talked
through these issues with him, but from my reading of his work in the
past and following the disclosure of the identity of Deep Throat, it
seemed to me that the one overwhelming issue for that source was
that his name never be revealed to the public. The truth is that
under the law in Supreme Court decisions that existed at the time,
Bob Woodward could give that assurance to that source. Let me
emphasize again, that assurance cannot be given today. I think that
this is having, as the subject of this conference suggests, a chilling
effect on men and women, and that it is also influencing the
willingness of people like me to talk to people like some of you in this
room, who carry a pen and a pad for a living. We do not know when
it is happening—that is the very nature of the chilling effect since it is
impossible to assess the impact of it—but we know it is happening.
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It is hard for me to look at the recent Judith Miller case, whatever
you make of it, in which the revealing of a CIA official was at the very
core of that case. A White House official, now convicted of perjury—
answering to the law—began that case by telling what was, in that
moment, the truth to a reporter off the record. Indeed, there was a
falsehood that was found before the grand jury later, but I want you
to ponder that for a moment and ask yourself what signal that sends
to people like me. When a reporter walks up and says, “Seriously just
off the record, what is going on here?” That case stands as one of
many monuments to the fact that reporters cannot protect
confidential sources, and I believe it is having an effect today, in real
time, on the free flow of information.
Specifically, regarding the situation where a reporter is being asked
to reveal the identity of a confidential source, our bill provides several
exceptions. In order for a reporter to be compelled to reveal a
source, the situation has to fall specifically in one of these exceptions.
Sources can be revealed under exceptions for national security where
an imminent threat of bodily harm or death exists. There is an
exception where trade secrets have been revealed, or where personal
health or financial information has been revealed in violation of the
law. We added further clarification in the Judiciary Committee to
those exceptions. Under the manager’s amendment, compelled
disclosure of a source will only be permitted if it is necessary to
prevent—here we changed the language—terrorism or a significant
specific harm to national security. Also under the manager’s
amendment, it prevented the shield privilege from being claimed by
a foreign power or agents of a foreign power.
Our legislation has also dealt with the whole question of who does
this apply to, whom are covered persons under the bill. Under our
legislation, covered persons are those able to use the shield, and
frankly, there is a lot of discussion about Congress defining who is a
journalist. I am somewhat troubled at the very prospect of that
project. In this legislation we have attempted to make it clear that a
covered person is engaged in journalism for financial gain or
livelihood and that no terrorist will be able to qualify. Other than
that, it is a very, very broad definition and it may yet be broader. At
the close of the Judiciary Committee’s mark-up where we reported
this bill for the first time, Chairman Conyers challenged the members
to form a working group to deal with several issues, including the
definition of a journalist, and that working group is diligently
pursuing this.
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I know the ACLU has had significant input on the development of
this legislation and that it is participating through counsel in the
working group. We are grateful for that leadership. The objective
here—and this comes from someone who first filed the shield bill
providing for an absolute privilege—is to read the First Amendment
and know that there is not an asterisk next to it. But the nature of
the legislative process and the challenges to the national government
regarding national security lead us to try to shape that qualified
privilege. It does seem to me, however, that we need to guard against
distorting it into a manner whereby, for instance, corporations could
publish a newsletter and then claim a media shield protection. We
want to cover people that are involved in the journalistic enterprise in
large ways or in small ways.
Lastly, it is important to know what the bill does not do. It does
not give reporters a license to break the law in the name of news
gathering, and it does not give them the right to interfere with police
or prosecutors who are trying to prevent crimes. It leaves laws on
classified information unchanged. It simply gives journalists certain
rights and abilities to seek sources and report appropriate
information without fear of intimidation or imprisonment. Just as, in
the public interest, we allow psychiatrists, clergy, and social workers to
maintain confidences. This is not really a radical thought. With such
a qualified privilege, reporters will be ensured the ability to get the
American people the information they need to make informed
choices. As I said before, I believe a free and independent press is
the only agency in America that has complete freedom to hold the
government accountable.
I am someone that likes to crack open the Old Book from time to
time. And the day of our mark-up, I was reading in my morning
devotional time and I came across a verse in the Bible that simply
challenged the reader to stand firm and to not let himself be
burdened again by the yoke of slavery, adding that it was for freedom
that Christ set us free. I had to ponder that as I went in, and I ended
up making those comments as I closed my remarks in the Judiciary
Committee that day.
In a very real sense, it was for purposes of freedom that our
Founders, many of whom shared my Christian convictions, enshrined
the freedom of press in the First Amendment. The American people,
interested parties, and members of Congress all should seize this
legislative moment to stand firm and not let ourselves be burdened
by any yoke or any action that infringes on our fundamental
freedoms as Americans.
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I want to thank the ACLU for its strong support of a media shield
in a very real sense and for its partnership in this legislative project.
And I hope, and literally pray, that before this Congress is out, we will
see a strong bipartisan vote in the House and the Senate that sends to
the President of the United States legislation that will repair this tear
in the First Amendment; it will strengthen the free and independent
press for generations to come. Thank you very much. I am happy to
take questions.
QUESTION: What are the prospects of the legislation passing when it
reports out of the Senate Judiciary Committee?
CONGRESSMAN PENCE: When I introduced this bill in the last
Congress, the then Republican chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, Jim Sensenbrenner, expressed a willingness to consider
the bill in our Committee, and told me that the challenge, given the
nature of the rules of the Senate, is the Senate Judiciary Committee.
So in the last Congressional session, we focused on, with the strong
support of Chairman Specter, trying to achieve progress in the Senate
Judiciary Committee by having not one, but I think two, maybe three,
hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. I continue to
believe that, in terms of the foot race that we are involved in, the
highest hurdle we are going to have to overcome could be today.
There is some word, however, that one of the members of the
Senate has asked for a one week delay, and that may bump us a week.
But the ability of one member of the Judiciary Committee to put a
hold on a piece of legislation is pretty heady stuff. One member can
say I do not want to proceed and announce a filibuster and that
pretty much kills it. We are cautiously optimistic that the version that
has been introduced in the Senate which, I am very humbled to say is
largely based on the version we have been producing in the House
with many improvements, could pass. Then, I think it is just a matter
of organizations like the ACLU and freedom-loving groups—on the
left, right, and in the center—around the country clamoring for the
Congress to move this onto the floor. I have no doubt that if the Free
Flow of Information Act was brought to the floor of the House of
Representatives, it would receive a decisive bipartisan vote.
Some of my less cheerful conservative colleagues may be not be
able to be persuaded, (Laughter) but you would be surprised. Some
of the most ardent conservatives on the House Judiciary Committee
voted in favor of reporting our bill. I will let them name names, but I
was very humbled by that. It was truly a bipartisan vote in the
Committee, and I believe it would be a bipartisan vote on the floor.
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But I cannot emphasize enough that in my seventh year in
Congress, there is what I call the gale force wind that would do
something—to borrow an old economic term describing the only real
power in Washington, D.C. Okay. When the American people say
“Do it,” Congress usually says “Okay” because it has been said the
Congress does two things well: nothing and overreact. (Laughter)
So we are trying to make sure that by the time they get the message,
the country actually cherishes a free and independent press.
I represent a district in Eastern Indiana that is a rural district and
includes Muncie, Anderson, and other little towns. People stop me
on the street when they hear Senator Lugar and I have been working
on this, and they say, “You know, that is really great you are doing
that.” Because people understand that reporters are on their side.
They do not like reporters anymore than they like us, but they
understand reporters are on their side. To the extent that we can
convey to the American people that this is not about protecting
reporters, but rather about protecting the people’s right to know,
then people e-mail, phone, write and clamor in support of this. I
have no doubt that we would be able to move this legislation in this
Congress, if that occurs. Thank you for the question.
QUESTION: Could you talk a little more about the definition of these bills,
the reporters, and how that might have stalled progress in the past?
CONGRESSMAN PENCE: Yes. I would have to ask Josh, who is my
legal counsel here, to give you an exact number of versions covered,
but let me tell you that the first version apparently applied to some
journalists, but not to bloggers. That did not go over very well in the
blogosphere. (Laughter) When I Googled my name a couple of
years ago and my hard drive crashed, (Laughter) I realized that
maybe we have a problem here. We have really been trying to go
hammer and tongue on that. Here, is the tension. Because whether
you are a Matt Drudge who is making phone calls and posting things
on the Internet, when he was doing it on his own, it sure seemed like
he was involved in the journalistic enterprise to me. But what you
want to avoid is creating a new qualified privilege in the sense of a
shield to people that are actually not involved in the enterprise of
journalism. I mentioned the corporate newsletter would be one
example. We try to deal with this in the definition—that subsidiary
corporations cannot acquire a privilege for the corporate parent. For
example, take GE—it seems like they own everything. But if GE owns
a television network that has a news division, and the corporation
ends up involved in a federal case, can it claim the privilege? GE
would argue that it is a media company, so this law applies. That has
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been the tension that we have been facing and we have the widest
possible definition of people involved. The word “livelihood” seems
like one that Republicans and Democrats on the Committee felt
pretty good about. If you make a living doing this, that might be a
good test.
The other thing that we also want to focus on is the issue of newsgathering or fact-gathering. I am actually the first member of
Congress to have a blog. I think half of the Members of Congress
have blogs, but the New York Times put me in its big write-up because
we blog in my office and because I blog from all over the world. I am
not a journalist. And the very fact that I put information on the
Internet or link people to articles that I think are compelling and
interesting does not mean that I think the law should necessarily
extend additional legal protections to me. That is another part of the
challenge that we face. But I would love for you to take a look at our
latest iteration. I read all my e-mail, all my mail, and I would love to
have your thoughts on it.

